Why Europe is at War

The Question Considered from the Points of View of France · England · Germany · Japan & The United States

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Why Europe is at War

The Question Considered

From the Points of View of

France, England, Germany, Japan, and The United States

By

Frederic R. Coudert—Frederick W. Whitridge
Edmund von Mach—Toyokichi Iyenaga
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With Portraits

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

THE Addresses presented in the following volume were delivered in Buffalo on the seventh of February, 1915, and the interest expressed in them by the very large audience that was present and by the press of Buffalo and elsewhere was evidence that the speakers, all representative men, had made noteworthy contributions to the analysis of the war conditions in Europe and that their utterances were deserving of preservation in book form. Papers of this kind, presented by writers who have authoritative knowledge of the subject-matter and who are keenly interested in the result of a pending contest, belong to what may be called contemporary history, and while of immediate service for the readers of to-day, possess importance also for later generations.

NEW YORK,
March 31, 1915.

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FOREWORD

In bringing this book to the attention of the public, it is proper to mention that the right, title, and interest in the contract, vested in myself as editor, have been assigned to The Charity Organization Society of Buffalo. It is the purpose that whatever proceeds may be secured from this volume, which presents the issues of the European War, shall go to the benefit of the unemployed poor of the city of Buffalo who are innocent and indirect victims of this war. I desire to make acknowledgment further to my friend, Major George Haven Putnam, of the historic publishing house of G. P. Putnam's Sons, now in the eighty-third year of its useful activities in the field of letters, for the suggestion of utilizing for book publication the material of these noteworthy addresses.

The meeting at which these addresses were delivered had its origin, like so many other things in life, in what we are accustomed to call chance or accident. I happened to be in New York for the

purpose of seeing some people, who could not come to Buffalo, on a commercial matter connected with the business in which I earn my living. I had just received the notice of the "Non-Partisan Discussions" which at this season, for several years, the Republican Club has been in the habit of conducting on Saturday afternoons; and I decided to take the opportunity to hear one of them. The subject for this particular Saturday—January 16th—was THE GREAT WAR, and the speakers were Chancellor MacCracken, Dr. Iyenaga, Dr. Dernburg, Rev. Dr. Holmes, and Rev. Dr. Carter. I confess to disappointment in Dr. Dernburg, of whose writings I had read a great deal. He proved to be—what Marc Antony untruthfully described himself—no orator. Not so with Dr. Iyenaga, the speaker who preceded him; who, speaking in a clear and resonant voice, without manuscript or notes of any kind, never lacking or hesitating for the exact word, held his audience for more than forty-five minutes literally spellbound in wonder and astonishment at, and admiration for, so unusual a performance.

I determined at once that I would if possible have a similar discussion in Buffalo, and through the liberality and harmonious co-operation of press and public, committees and proprietors, the

meeting was held with conspicuous success. It was an intensely dramatic occasion: A beautiful playhouse, a brilliant audience filling every seat except the farther reaches of the upper galleries, and on the stage chosen and fitting representatives of the Latin, the Anglo-Saxon, the Teuton, and the Japanese races, four out of the five races which rule the world—explaining, in characteristic racial fashion, what each nation was fighting for—and three of these races fighting for their very lives as independent nations. The speakers—except the Anglo-Saxon, who was characteristically unimpassioned—were stirred with a genuine passion which even the greatest of play-actors cannot simulate, as they, speaking without notes of any kind, walking up and down the stage and gesticulating with vehemence, recited the wrongs which they had suffered and gave vent to the hatred which the acts of their foes had excited. We knew that Mr. Coudert could hold the attention of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court for four and five hours at a stretch, but none of us had before realized the dramatic possibilities of his mobile face with its flashing eyes and facile mouth; we knew that Dr. von Mach was no disciple of Treitschke and Nietzsche, no admirer of Bernhardi, but we had not appreciated how pro-

foundly he could be stirred, as—one against three—he defended his Vaterland against the charges put forth by his opponents; we knew that all things are possible to the modern highly educated Japanese gentleman, but those who for the first time heard Dr. Iyenaga were simply astounded at his knowledge of the English idiom, his keen satire, his biting sarcasm, and the lofty enthusiasm with which he declared that if the soldiers of his race came to France in this war they would come only because their word was pledged and their ally claimed them; and they would come "not as hirelings, not as the Hessians came to this country one hundred and forty years ago."

It was my pleasing duty to preside at this unique meeting. I submitted in advance to each speaker a typewritten draft of what I intended to say—speaking from memory—in introducing him. Each gave his unqualified and even grateful approval. Such efforts gain success under the glamour of the occasion, spoken at a late hour of the night, in the environment of an audience whose enthusiasm is worked up to the highest pitch by the emotions of the moment. In the cold grey dawn, and the still colder type, of to-morrow and the day after, they are as garish as the paint and tinsel of the stage itself when exposed to sunlight.

They will not be reproduced here. But some extracts from them seem to be necessary if the "atmosphere" of the speakers is to be faithfully reproduced. I spoke of France, as "the land where the Arts and Sciences have reached the highest development ever known to man; the land to whose beautiful fields and splendid capital people flock each year from every quarter of the globe; whose people in this titanic war have shown those qualities of grim determination and calm but intense energy which we in our conceit have been wont to characterize as attributes of the Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic races."

Of England—being myself of unmixed New England and Old England ancestry—I could only say: "I love England; I love London, with its fog and its grime, its Abbey and its Tower, its tubes and its busses."

We Americans can well feel pride at the sturdy and hopeful courage with which our British cousins—a peace-loving people—absolutely unprepared for the storm which has so suddenly burst upon them—having much to risk and nothing to gain from war—have accepted their responsibilities for the fulfilment of their obligations to Belgium and to France and for the defence of their empire, and, under the fierce training of actual warfare, are

creating an army of citizens. I do not undertake to say that in this most colossal of all wars England is right; while I am certainly unwilling to take the ground that her decision for war was wrong, and that there was any other way open for her in which she could have maintained her honour and have fulfilled her responsibilities.

In a controversy of such phenomenal and unprecedented magnitude I do not presume to pass judgment on any of the nations. I leave that where it belongs, with Almighty God.

Of Germany: "Now, where will you find greater efficiency than in Germany? Did Alexander or Cæsar or Frederick or Napoleon have a finer army than that which the Kaiser now commands?

"Whatever may be the judgment of Americans as to the causes of the war or as to the aims of the several nations who are taking part in the contest, I do not see how any man with red blood in his veins can fail to give his meed of admiration to the German people which, with a magnificent organization and with the highest devotion on the part of the men in the ranks, has undertaken a struggle against such a great group of opponents, a struggle in which during the past six months more men have been killed than in six years of previous warfare. In expressing our appreciation of the fighting

qualities of the soldiers of Germany we are not to forget the patriotic devotion and courage shown by the men of little Belgium, ally of France and of England, in the apparently hopeless attempt to defend their soil and to maintain their liberties against the overwhelming onslaught of the German invaders."

Of Japan: "We—United States—brought Japan, somewhat unwilling, into the family of nations, when Perry, first with his fleet and his guns but without firing a shot, opened her gates; and then with his treaty of March 31, 1854, formally presented this shy people to the society of Europe and America. But in these sixty-one years what a change! What a record of accomplishment! The venerable traditions of Japan, with her high civilization antedating that of Cæsar Augustus and coeval with that of Pericles, her exquisite art and her wonderful literature, are still her own. But in mechanics, in shipping, in commerce, in industry, Japan is now rival to all the foremost in the world. Ay, a virile race that, though small in stature; capable of self-denial, of discipline, of devotion to a cause, absolutely unsurpassed if not unrivalled. In war, Japan has in succession defeated the two most populous nations of the world and has won at Tshushima a naval

victory which outclasses every battle on the sea from Salamis to Trafalgar and Manila Bay. In peace her people are gentle, industrious, polite, courteous to a fault, but proud and sensitive like all high-bred people."

I endeavoured to convey some idea of the personality of the speakers, two of whom were life-long friends, and one of them a friend of recent acquaintance, but none the less highly esteemed, by speaking of Mr. COUDERT "as a great international lawyer, whose grandfather was wounded at Leipsic; whose father was the friend and adviser of President Cleveland, as he is himself the friend and adviser of President Wilson; who at the age of twenty-eight conducted as senior counsel, with John G. Carlisle, a contemporary of his honoured father, as junior counsel, those great *Insular Cases* in the Supreme Court of the United States, the arguments of which fill an entire volume (Reports, United States 182), the decision of which settled for all time the status under our Constitution of the overseas possessions which the unexpected results of the war with Spain threw upon us.

And he is not a lawyer only. He has served in the only war in which his country has been engaged since he grew to manhood. In the War with Spain he commanded Troop A of the New York

Volunteers, and under the orders of General Miles took part in the capture of Porto Rico.

"Though his sympathies are with France in this gigantic struggle, yet he is above all an American citizen, as were his father and grandfather before him; for his grandfather, after being involved in a plot to place Napoleon's son on the throne of France in place of Louis XVIII., and being condemned to be shot for his complicity in this conspiracy, escaped to America and was an ardent citizen of these United States for the remaining sixty years of his life."

Of Mr. WHITRIDGE: "An American citizen by birth as well as by affection, a distinguished lawyer, a man of large affairs, the President of one of the great traction systems in New York. He also has an office in London as well as in New York, a summer home in Scotland, where he was when the war broke out. His son, Arnold Whitridge (named after his grandfather, Matthew Arnold), is an undergraduate in an American university, but he now holds the King's commission as a Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery. As soon as the snow melts he will go with the rest of Kitchener's men to join his comrades in the trenches in an effort to put an end to this terrible war."

Of Dr. VON MACH: "That virile race is repre-

sented here to-night by a worthy scion—an educated gentleman, a graduate of Harvard, once a teacher at Harvard, no blusterer, but a writer of books and student of archeology, calm, temperate, thorough, a solid, hardheaded thinker, with a command of his adopted language, similar to that which his great countryman, Carl Schurz, used to display to the astonishment and admiration of all his hearers and readers.

"His kinsmen are on the firing line, fighting for their Vaterland, and he will tell—as none better can—what they are fighting for."

Of Dr. IYENAGA: "Her representative here to-night is typical of the best of her highly educated men. Born in Japan, educated at Oberlin, and afterwards at Johns Hopkins, a professor of history at Chicago, a traveler in India, a diplomat in Turkey and Persia, he is an honour to his people. But why go on talking about him! Let me ask only one question which may serve to fix his status in your minds. Is there one among the 28,000,000 grown men in this country who can go to Tokio and make in the Japanese tongue such an address as you are going to listen to in your own language?"

When the long-continued applause which followed Dr. Iyenaga's speech had finally ceased,

I turned to him and said: "Now, Dr. Iyenaga, do you understand why I placed you last in the list of speakers? I called time on every other speaker at twenty-five minutes, and each of them finished within four minutes more. I said nothing to you, and you have spoken forty-eight minutes."[1]

The proceedings were appropriately terminated by the Rev. Cameron J. Davis, Rector of Trinity Church, in Buffalo, who read the appointed prayer of the Protestant Episcopal Church for peace, which is in these words:

> O God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, our only Saviour, the Prince of Peace, give to the nations across the sea grace seriously to lay to heart the danger they and we are in by the unhappy conflicts that have broken out among them. Give them a right sense of the responsibility for, and the awful horror and evil of war. Make them to realize that with Thee is power, and that Thou canst lift up or cast down a people at Thy will. May the spirit of wisdom, patience, and self-control come to the counsels of those with whom the direction of the contending navies and armies rest. May cruelty be banished and mercifulness be manifested

[1] As here printed the speeches are of about equal length; but in order to keep the meeting within proper limits of time I interrupted each speaker (except Dr. Iyenaga) at the end of twenty-five minutes. It was understood in advance that in revising the stenographic notes of his address, each speaker was at liberty to add to it up to approximately 10,000 words.

one toward another, amid the pains and wounds of the battlefield, whether friend or enemy be the sufferer there. Stay, we beseech Thee, the pain and the misery, the sorrow and the want, the fierceness and the enmity which now desolate the earth. And speedily, if it be Thy will, send forth upon the nations of the world Thy blessing of peace. We ask these things in the name of Jesus Christ our Saviour. Amen.

Such was the origin, progress, and end of our meeting. What the speakers said is contained in the following pages—addresses 1 to 4 inclusive. The Epilogue is outside of my original plan for the Buffalo meeting, and it formed no part of what took place there. It has been written within the last week, and it is printed here solely because my friend, Major Putnam, asked me to write it, and in terms of such insistence that his request could not be denied.

FRANCIS V. GREENE.

BUFFALO
March 29, 1915.

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD v

WHAT FRANCE IS FIGHTING FOR . . . 3
By Frederic R. Coudert

WHAT ENGLAND IS FIGHTING FOR . . . 57
By Frederick W. Whitridge

WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR . . . 85
By Dr. Edmund von Mach

WHY JAPAN IS IN THIS WAR 115
By Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga

EPILOGUE 141
The Point of View of the United States

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

FREDERIC R. COUDERT 3
From a photograph by Bradley, New York.

FREDERICK W. WHITRIDGE 57
Copyright, 1906 by Marceau.

DR. EDMUND VON MACH 85
From a photograph by Marceau, Boston.

DR. TOYOKICHI IYENAGA 115
From a photograph by Kikuchi, New York.

GEN. FRANCIS V. GREENE 141
From a photograph by Garford, New York.

WHAT FRANCE IS FIGHTING FOR

By Frederic R. Coudert



Photo by Bradley, New York

Frederick R. Comclert

WHAT FRANCE IS FIGHTING FOR

I CANNOT, without a certain sense of sadness, recall the last meeting in your hospitable city at which I was present, on January 7, 1912. The question then discussed was the ratification by the Senate of the proposed arbitration treaties with France and Great Britain. Our hopes ran high and we felt that we were on the verge of an era of peace and good will among the nations in which the quiet strivings of the forum, the appeals to reason and law were destined to take the place of the strident sound of cannon and the arbitrament of the machine gun.

At that meeting we were dreaming world peace. At the present moment we witness world war. Discomforted and almost stunned by the suddenness with which Europe in the early days of August plunged headlong into conflict over matters which seemed so readily susceptible of adjustment, the American people find it difficult to realize how such a result could have come about. Among the most civilized portion of mankind all that science

has taught, that method has organized, that money can purchase, that ability can devise is now used not to aid humanity but to destroy human life and property; even the common inherited treasures of mankind, cathedrals and public edifices, the slow product of generations of artists, thinkers, and workers, absolutely impossible of reproduction, are shattered into bits by the ingenious devices of modern ballistics. The scientific acquisition of thirty years is thus focused upon destroying all that is most precious to humanity and we seem only to have advanced in order that the engines of demolition might be made more complete. Incalculable as are the losses, physical and material, they are yet outweighed by the tremendous moral retrogression involved in unchaining the primitive passions of millions of men. Complacent dreams of "progress" have been rudely shattered.

Close students of politics and history have warned us of the approaching and inevitable struggle, but I think I may safely say that the American public at least did not believe it possible that the leading nations of civilized Europe should in the twinkling of an eye and without even an attempt at mediation or adjustment rush at each other's throats. Buckle, the philo-

sopher and historian, whose writings were so much in vogue a generation ago, contended that war was due to ignorance and barbarity and predicted that the growth of knowledge and science, improved means of communication, and consequent interchange of opinion between the various peoples of Europe must necessarily bring about general peace.

This certainly was the widely accepted view and evidently appeals to the reason of men, yet the prophecy has failed utterly and completely. Even the people of the United States, supposedly the most pacific of nations, found themselves at war in 1898, and almost continuously ever since have some of the nations of Europe been engaged in serious conflict.

That we Americans should seem to be particularly interested in the attitude of France is but natural and fitting. In the darkest days of American history, France understood what America was fighting for and her answer came, not in the form of mere sympathetic phrases, but in the person of Lafayette and his generous comrades, followed a little later by the valiant army and navy of France which so decisively turned the scale in favour of the hard-pressed revolutionists. No real American can forget the story of that

dark and dreary winter at Valley Forge when even the stoutest hearts were despondent and Washington in the midst of his shivering, half-clad, and half-fed followers wrote:

> Unless some great and capital change takes place the army must be inevitably reduced to one or other of three things,—starve, dissolve, or disperse.

It seemed as though naught save a miracle could save the cause, and yet the miracle happened, and France,—herself in great distress and on the verge of bankruptcy,—throwing to the winds the counsels of prudence, followed the impulse of that spontaneous generosity so common in individuals, so rare in nations.

France had not then learned, and perhaps never will learn, that cold common sense and calculation may well be thought to constitute the only legitimate factors in directing the policy of a nation, while enthusiasm in the cause of another people which is waging war against oppression or injustice, is a dangerous element in national politics. She, however, has never hesitated to make the cause of humanity her own.

Has it not been rightly said that every man has two countries—his own and France? Does not this epigrammatic and paradoxical form of expres-

sion recognize the truth of history that France has struggled and suffered more than any other nation in the cause of mankind?

The wars of the Revolution and of Napoleon, destructive and unnecessary though some may have been, were induced mainly by an enthusiasm for the rights of man and for the betterment of humanity—that same feeling which agitated the French nation in its struggle against ancient privilege and which has marked the destruction of the Bastile as the birth of civil liberty on the continent of Europe.

Some have compared the wars of Napoleon with what they now believe to be the ruthless and aggressive war of Germany and Austria for commercial and territorial aggrandizement, and while the personal ambition and egotistic love of glory of the great conqueror are not to be minimized, we must yet remember that Napoleon brought with him not only the sword but the great Civil Code which has since his time so largely formed the basis of European private rights, consecrating the equality of man before the law; that he carried with him those ideas, hopes, and aspirations of the Revolution which made a return to the old régime of divine right and hereditary governmental privilege permanently impossible wherever his legions had

bivouacked. "Napoleon," said Metternich, "was the incarnation of the Revolution."

We, in America, far from the blinding actualities of the great conflict, have earnestly concerned ourselves with the underlying causes and sought to locate the responsibility for this greatest of all wars, for if it be found that any one nation or government or régime is responsible, public opinion must adjudge it the enemy of civilization and seek means to avoid a repetition of this world disaster.

One of our difficulties is that each of the nations at war admits the major premise, that war itself is a wrong and an evil. No one is willing to accept the responsibility for the first blow and each would seek to claim that its adversary was to blame. Thus is the war itself denounced by all and thus do the parties admit that it would have been unnecessary had it not been for the aggression of the other. It is, therefore, pertinent and timely for us to inquire what each nation is fighting for and this question may naturally divide itself, first, into what the peoples of each nation believe they are fighting for; and, second, whether their belief is based upon reality.

It seems somewhat strange to one who is somewhat familiar with the French people, French lit-

erature and opinion and who spent the first six weeks of the war in France, that any one should ask what France is fighting for. This was not asked by French people. It was instinctively felt in all classes that the nation must fight against militant and unprovoked aggression in defence of those things which men hold most dear —the home, the family, and the soil. That was accepted without question. For a Frenchman to have asked such a question of another would have seemed to savour of imbecility. Travelling about and seeing many soldiers, men of all classes from members of the Parliament to peasants, and asking them why they were going to war, I received practically the same answer. Men from the South and men from the North replied to me in almost the same terms: "*Ah, Monsieur! Il le fallait. Ça ne pouvait durer*" (Oh, sir! It could last no longer. It was inevitable).

It is extraordinary how universal and how deep seated was the conviction that like an impending but furious cataclysm of nature, this war had fallen on a reluctant people. The French accepted war as a brave and stoical man would accept the fact of pestilence, feeling that after having done what he could to avoid it, he must set his house in order and endeavour to resist its ravage.

As the historian Green has somewhere remarked, the instinct of a people is often wiser than the statecraft of kings, and our query now is, whether the deep-seated conviction of the people that they were forced by circumstances beyond their control to fight in defence of all that they held dear as against ruthless aggression was true. Was this conviction merely the result of skilful newspaper agitation? Did it result from the speeches of noisy demagogues, or did the French peasant and artisan truly gauge the result of forty-three years of relations with his powerful neighbour to the East? I believe he did. I believe that the general feeling of the American public that France was forced to fight in order to repel German attack—calculated, inevitable, and prompted by a desire to crush France and take from her her colonial possessions—will also be the judgment of posterity.

An examination of French literature and of periodicals for many years back indicate that every movement in Europe for peace and disarmament has been championed, if not initiated, by France. The most powerful men in the French Parliament and in French public life have raised their voices in favour of humanity as against national jealousy and racial feeling. It was only fourteen months before the war that the most in-

fluential orator in the nation nearly succeeded in defeating the three-year law—a law intending to keep conscripts with the colours for a year longer and which was proposed in answer to the German military preparations of 1913. The acclaim which the opposition to this proposed law met indicated that a great part of the French population were so opposed to great armament that they were willing to imperil the national safety, in their desire to avoid it. Fortunately for the nation, the orator failed and the prediction of his adversaries that this measure was a measure of necessary national safety was verified a little more than a year later when German troops crossed the frontier.

In order to understand the situation, we must go back to the war of 1870 and the foundation of the German Empire and from that date on we must trace briefly for forty-three years the intercourse between the two nations. This intercourse will show, not a condition of real peace, as we understand it, but a long continued series of threats, menaces, and acts of aggression, designed to keep France in constant fear of Germany's military power and to retain her in that position of inferiority which she occupied after the disastrous war of 1870–71 *l'année terrible*. These years constitute

a time of tension such as few nations have been subjected to.

Popular opinion had it, and perhaps still has it, that the war of '70 was caused by France or at least by the government of Napoleon III. Historic revelations, contained in documents since published and in the statements and publications of the chief participants in the conflict, have proved that Prussia, under the headship of her great diplomat and leader, Prince von Bismarck, had resolved upon war with France as a method of uniting North and South Germany and creating a great empire. The falsification of the famous Ems telegram, distorting the correct diplomatic interview between the King of Prussia and the French Ambassador into an insult to the French nation, was cynically avowed by Bismarck as a diplomatic stratagem by which he proposed to shift the apparent onus of the war on France. In this he was completely successful and France was left isolated, in a conflict for which she was ill-prepared and which the mass of her people did not desire. Beaten and humiliated, she was forced to sue for peace, and, in addition to the most enormous war indemnity ever exacted, to give up two of her fairest provinces.

In insisting upon the cession of Alsace and

Lorraine, German diplomacy did worse than blunder: it committed a crime against morality, the consequences of which it was impossible to avoid. Two millions of people, the mass of them under French rule for two centuries, permeated with the French civilization and culture, devotedly attached to France, were rudely torn from her by military force and placed under the iron heel of military domination. Enlightened men throughout the world were able to see the injustice of this procedure and the hypocrisy which alleged racial reasons for justifying the suppression of the French nationality of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine.

This step had been contemplated by Prussia when, as a member of the victorious coalition against Napoleon, she had, through her great minister Stein, in 1815, asked that the eastern frontier provinces be taken from France. That she should have failed in this was due to the opposition of France's two greatest enemies, Wellington and Alexander III., who, prompted by an enlightened policy, realized the inexpediency of forcing a highly civilized people into an allegiance abhorrent to them. Wellington urged his objection to the demand of a great territorial cession from France and wisely insisted

that it will defeat the object which the allies have held out to themselves in the present and preceding wars.[1]

What a pity for the world's peace that fifty-six years later, Bismarck could not have shown similar wisdom.

The Czar Alexander, a man of broad views and of large and generous impulses, rejected the Prussian claim and referred "to the preference of the Alsatians for France" and said "*the observance of engagements was a better guaranty than fortresses.*"[2]

Thus in 1871 Prussian diplomacy finally achieved what it failed to accomplish in 1815. Prussia at last had her wish and France was dismembered; dismembered so scientifically indeed that her frontier was left open, that she might always remain in a position of military inferiority to Germany—and her heart, Paris, be susceptible of rapid and ready attack. All the advantages of her natural frontiers were taken from her and she was placed in a position where, save for the industry, sobriety, and intelligence of her people, she would have remained almost in vassalage to the war-loving Teuton. "War," said Napoleon, "is the national industry of Prussia."

[1] *Life and Times of Stein*, Seeley, vol. iii., p. 336.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

The eminent scholar, Dr. von Mach, who today speaks for his country, has himself stated in a recent publication in explanation and defence of the taking of Alsace-Lorraine:

> The people of Alsace are almost entirely of German stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from the name of which the French name for Germany, Allemagne, is derived.

After commenting upon the fact that their native speech is German, he says:

> In spite of this Bismarck foresaw that France would not rest while she could hope some day to regain these provinces. *The very peace, therefore, which concluded the Franco-Prussian war laid the foundation of another war in the future.* This was a heavy price to pay, but without Alsace and Lorraine the South German States felt unable to join the federation of the German Empire.

It is evident that even Prince von Bismarck had scarce the same confidence and belief in the German characteristics of the people for he thought that it was

> to be expected that the strong French elements which will survive in the country for a long while will induce the people to unite with France in the case of another Franco-German war.

Thus these reluctant provinces, despite the protest of their population represented by their deputies at the Assembly at Bordeaux, were transferred to another allegiance on the ostensible ground that they belonged to Germany, although the German Empire, to which they were now turned over, had existed but a few months. If one thing be certain it is that they never had anything in common with Prussia, by whose king they have ever since been ruled.

The real reason, however, of the seizure was that Germany wished so to weaken France that she might at any time dispose of her militarily. As the German General Staff put it: "A German Metz means a pistol on the temple of France." That the pistol has ever since been held in threatening attitude and has been cocked and agitated vigorously from time to time during the last forty-three years is matter of contemporary history which I propose very briefly to sketch. The race theory was merely designed to appease scruples abroad and to please overwrought imaginations at home.

I wish nevertheless to challenge this specious theoretical pretext upon which the provinces were taken over by the new German Empire—a pretext evidently intended for the satisfaction of senti-

mentalists who might have recoiled, as did the Emperor Alexander and the Iron Duke, from placing two million unwilling citizens in subjection to a power for which they had declared their abhorrence. Even Bismarck a few years before had felt compunction at the suggestion that Alsace should forcibly be transferred to Prussian domination, for in 1867 he had said to Mr. Beatty Kingston:

> Suppose France entirely conquered and a Prussian garrison in Paris, what are we to do with our victory. *We could not even decently take Alsace, for the Alsatians have become Frenchmen and wish to remain so.*

The fact is that there is neither logic nor historic truth in the race theory. The peoples of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separate principalities throughout the ever-changing politics of the Middle Age having each a different history, are yet both peoples of a mixed race in which Germanic and Celto-Roman elements are inextricably blended. The latest history of Alsace and Lorraine speaks of the latter element, that is the Celto-Roman element, as dominant.

> If one may judge from the kind of adjectives applied to the Lorraine character in the chronicles

> of successive epochs, the military and chivalric spirit, sensitiveness, a tendency to religious fantasy, witty conversation are repeatedly mentioned as its attributes.[1]

The learned and eminent historian not unnaturally concludes that these characteristics exclude the hypothesis of a dominance of German blood. It would be as fair indeed to characterize the people of Brandenburg and Prussia as Celtic,—for the basic population of those principalities was essentially Slavic and Lithuanian and was Germanized by colonists,—as to treat that of Lorraine as German. Even the now famous Treitschke was himself of Slavic origin—a curious commentary upon his philosophy of Teutonic race supremacy, one of those dangerous by-products of national vanity which when accompanied by physical force of a high order may lead to such national megalomania.

Metz contained a preponderance of the French long before her annexation to France, and Stanislas, last Duke of Lorraine, spoke of French as the national language of the people of the duchy. The people had become French in fact long before the death of their last Duke, 1766. As Miss Putnam says, however,

[1] *Alsace and Lorraine*, Putnam, p. 100.

> Undoubtedly the German spoken—when it was not the Lorraine patois—was a debased speech, French being the standard for the better classes. It does not seem from casual observation that the knowledge of German was very extensive, although Frederick the Great assumes that a "Lorrainer" ought to understand German.[1]

The brief and emphatic disposition of the question in Dr. von Mach's observation that the inhabitants of the unfortunate provinces were German in race and in language, seems thus to dispose over-hastily of the verdict of history. The fact appears to be that a population composed of at least three elements, Celtic, Roman, and Germanic, speaking largely French, but with a considerable admixture of German patois, had after two centuries of union to France become Frenchmen with aspirations as truly national as the Frenchmen of Paris or of Toulouse. Enthusiastic devotees of the ideas of the Revolution they loved a régime of democracy and have never become reconciled to a governmental system based on "blood and iron."

In both of the provinces the revivifying influences of the Revolution had been deeply felt and the democratic doctrines then preached aroused the greatest measure of zealous devotion to France.

[1] *Alsace and Lorraine*, Putnam, p. 171.

The Revolution and the Empire of Napoleon had no warmer advocates than the Alsatians and in every great French victory, willing and generous Alsatian blood was shed. Ney, Oudinot, Victor, St. Cyr, Gérard, Lobau, Kellermann, Munier, Mouton, Regnier were from the lost provinces and even the distinguished German historian Heinrich von Sybel, bitterly as he felt toward the French, was yet unable to dispose of the question in a mere assertive phrase, for he says:

> We know, indeed, that the Lorrainers, since 1766, the Alsatians, since 1801, have become good Frenchmen, and today oppose, by a large majority, the reunion with their Fatherland. For such an attitude, we do not deny, we feel respect.

It is not without a sense of the vanity of prophecy, however, that we follow him when he says:

> But we trust to the power of nature; water can be diverted for a time into artificial channels, but with the removal of the dam will flow with the full stream. If today the inhabitants find the French more sympathetic than the Germans, soon they will find themselves among their own kind in Germany.

How completely has the history of the last twenty-five years in Alsace-Lorraine falsified the prophecy. The truth is that no nation can afford

to violate the fundamental principles of justice as understood in any age. If in earlier times it had been possible to transfer civilized peoples from one ruler to another, the American and the French Revolutions had signalized the death-knell of any such principle or practice.

Recent elections to the Reichstag are claimed as showing the love of the Alsatians for Prussian hegemony. They, of course, merely prove the efficiency of the Prussian bureaucracy in managing elections. That is no new story.

When Germany took Alsace she violated fundamental canons of morality and as Dr. von Mach very truly says, "sowed the seeds of a future war."

In 1871 and before the Treaty of Frankfort had been consummated, Ernest Renan and A. M. Strauss, intellectual leaders in France and Germany respectively, had a correspondence on the question as to whether the two provinces should be demanded by the German Empire. To Strauss's suggestion that the people were Germanic in origin and had formed in the past part of the old Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages, Renan pertinently replies:

> Lorraine undoubtedly formed a portion of the Germanic Empire; but so did Holland, Switzerland, and Italy up to Benevento, and going back in time

beyond the treaty of Verdun all of France and even Catalonia were parts of the Empire. Alsace is now a Germanic country in language and race; but before being invaded by the German race Alsace was a Celtic country, as was a portion of Southern Germany. We do not conclude from this that that portion of South Germany should be French, but we deny your right to maintain that by ancient law Metz and Strassburg should be German. Can any one say where this kind of archæology should stop? For almost every Germanic right that the advanced patriots of Germany claim, we could claim an earlier Celtic right, and before the Celtic period there existed, it is said, the Allophyles, the Finns, and the Laps; and before the Laps there were cave men and before the cave men there were the orang-outangs. So with this kind of philosophy of history the only legitimate justice in the world would be the right of the orang-outangs unjustly dispossessed by the perfidy of civilized peoples.

And again commenting upon the political theory which justified the transfer of the provinces, he said:

Our political theory [French] is the theory of the law of nations; our policy is the policy of respecting the law of nations; yours is the policy of races. We think ours the better. . . . Yours will be fatal to you. The comparative philology which you have created and mistakenly transported into the domain of politics, will play you a fatal turn. The Slavs believe it enthusiastically; every Slav schoolmaster becomes an enemy for you, a white ant who ruins

your house. How can you believe that Slavs will not do for you what you are doing to others; they in all things follow you step for step. Every affirmation of Germanism is an affirmation of Slavism.

He recalls the fact that Posen and Silesia are Germanic and that Russia might well ask their transfer on the same theory of race that Germany applied to Alsace. German leaders today may well be silent on the race theory.

We are told by certain German apologists that Alsace-Lorraine has been already Germanized. I say, without fear of contradiction from impartial observers and neutrals who have lived in that land or studied its recent history, that such is not the fact. German military methods have not taught the people to feel affection for Germany; on the contrary the iron heel of Germany's military power is more hated today than it has ever been.

Replying years ago to the tactless remark of a certain German Chancellor that he was pleased to see that France had forgotten Alsace-Lorraine, the French Ambassador to whom the remark was addressed said: "You Germans, sir, have dispensed us from the necessity of keeping them in mind."

The Alsatian had lived too long in the fold of the refined and gentle French civilization to fraternize with the Prussian. He loved France, its

ideas, its literature, its aspirations. Nor were the new methods employed calculated to alienate his affections from the old allegiance. Dr. von Mach speaks of the amount "of communal and individual freedom" which the provinces have enjoyed under German rule. But this "freedom" made it an offence to speak the French language which they loved, and created a régime of laws of exception, that is a kind of martial law utterly abhorrent to any free and civilized population, which permitted arbitrary acts as in time of war. The truth is that Alsace-Lorraine has been treated as a conquered province, despised by the Germans of the North who have attempted to Germanize it by force.

The provinces have been an armed camp and so strong has been the remembrance of France in the Alsatian mind that from 1900 to 1903, 22,000 young men risked death and exile by fleeing from their homes to enlist in the foreign legion of the French army. In vain the German press warned them against leaving Germany and of the horrors of going to Africa under the French flag. A larger number of Alsatians enlisted in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year since 1871. This is indeed a strange commentary upon the conciliatory and enlightened régime to which Dr. von

Mach refers. Strange "Kultur" indeed which inspires such devotion. Even among the girls there has been an enforced educational system excluding the French language and cutting them off from their beloved heritage of civilization, that the race might be Teutonized or Prussianized, and yet last year only when the Empress of Germany visited a German school and asked the girls what they wanted as a gift, they replied that "they might be taught a little French."[1]

The effects of German policy in the twentieth century and the beneficence of their rule were instanced only as recently as the autumn of 1913 in the Saverne incident when Lieutenant von Fostner, having before him a soldier accused of stabbing an Alsatian and who had been sentenced to two months' imprisonment, cried: "Two months on account of an Alsatian blackguard! I would have given you ten marks for your trouble."

The remark did not seem to please the docile population, whose affections had evidently not been completely won over by von Fostner's countrymen, for when he and his soldiers appeared on the streets they were hooted and Saverne was put under martial law.

In order, perhaps, to demonstrate the "commu-

[1] *New Map of England*, Gilbert, p. 16.

nal freedom" with which that lovely country has been blessed since 1871, Lieutenant von Fostner struck a lame shoemaker across the forehead with his sword. The matter had then reached a point where public sentiment in Europe demanded some action. The German military authorities did withdraw the garrison but gave the guilty officers merely nominal sentences and it was evident that their actions met with no real reproval and were indicative of the general sentiment in Prussia in regard to the people of Alsace.

The ideas of Nietschke and Treitschke and Bernhardi are not apparently calculated to make loving and loyal subjects out of those who have been forcibly transferred under the sceptre of Prussian militarism. "The will to power" is evidently not the way to love and affection. World opinion would seem rather to approve the very different methods employed by Great Britain in Canada, where fairness and justice have accomplished among the French population so admirably what "Kultur" and force have failed so lamentably to do in Alsace.

But we are told by Dr. von Mach of a petition presented by the Alsatian representative in the German Reichstag, in August, 1914, deploring the possibility of war between France and Germany:

> The idea of war between France and Germany is so terrible and awful for us people in Alsace that we hardly dare to think of it. We do not want a war between Germany and France at any cost, certainly not for the sake of altering our political position. People who have spread a different view among the French and have thereby fanned the French thoughts of war are traitors to our people and have drawn upon themselves the curses of thousands of Alsatian people: fathers, mothers, and wives who with bleeding hearts must see their sons and husbands go into the most terrible of wars.

I cannot but think it strange that this appeal should be held to indicate love of Germany. As the young Alsatians are forced into the German armies and are compelled to shoot Frenchmen, their parents can scarcely welcome war between the two countries, which, whatever its ultimate result, must in the interim destroy a great portion of the population of these unfortunate lands. Then, perhaps, like the petition of 1871 it was procured by fraud.[1]

Now, it is surely impossible to contemplate the history of Alsace-Lorraine since the cession without feeling that even from her own standpoint Germany made a fatal blunder in laying what Dr. von Mach so rightly calls "the foundation of another war."

[1] Putnam, p. 172.

It is not accurate, however, to suppose that this war is due to French hostility to Germany and desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine. "*Revanche*" connotes not revenge but rather redress. If the French have not and could not forget the unfortunate peoples whose hearts and minds have for the past forty-three years been so inclined to the country of their old allegiance, they have yet, in all that time, never done one act which could justly provoke the German Empire into hostility. During that long period of time the relations between the two have at nearly all times been severely strained and I propose to show that every untoward incident was due to the primary mistake consecrated by the Treaty of Frankfort in which Germany attempted so to weaken France as to place her in a quasi-dependent position in which she could scarce assert the rights inherent in every nation without menace from the German cannon.

Had Germany not thus endeavoured to destroy the balance of power in Europe and to inflict permanent and endless humiliation upon an old rival, this war would not and could not, in my judgment, have taken place. Yet however desirous France may have been for peace, the continuous German policy of interfering in French affairs, domestic and colonial, must in the end have forced the other

great nations of Europe to restore the balance of power thus menaced by Prussian militarism, now so strenuously striving for complete mastery in Europe.

French thrift and the ability of the French women to save enabled the gigantic indemnity of five milliards to be paid off before 1873 and French territory was finally liberated of German troops. France began to reconstitute her national life, and among other things her national defence, without which even the guaranties given her by the Treaty of Frankfort would have been of little value, and her life as a nation would have been in constant jeopardy.

In 1875, only two years after the withdrawal of the German troops and on the occasion of a vote of the Chamber for a very moderate increase and reorganization of the French army, the German press began to thunder for war and to claim that France had not been sufficiently crushed. Not only the press, but through diplomatic channels the French Ambassador in Berlin was informed of an imminent attack by Germany. If this attack did not take place, it was mainly due to the intervention of the Emperor of Russia, who, when the matter was recounted to him by the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, asserted that he

would not allow France to be surprised and attacked.[1]

Although it was not for some years after this that France and Russia entered into a defensive alliance (1879), yet amicable relations began at that time, Russia evidently appreciating the fact that its own interests would not permit the destruction of the French nation and the complete hegemony of Germany in Western Europe.

Germany continued after 1871 to increase its military forces and its army organization. Law after law for the last forty-three years has been passed to that effect, until in April, 1913, the regular standing army was raised to the extraordinary figure of 866,000 men and a war contribution of a milliard of marks was voted. This surely indicated the imminence of the blow.

During all this time France has only three times modified its military régime and always in reponse to an earlier military law of Germany. In 1889 by the establishment of three years' service; in 1905 by the reduction of the service to two years; and finally in August, 1913, and as a result of the German menace, the three years' service was re-established.

[1] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, vol. iii., p. 256.

In the early days of the war, German apologists cried out against the Slavic peril. This seems now to have been forgotten and hatred of Britannic power taken its place.

As far as France is concerned a defensive alliance with some other great power was a necessity if she were to maintain her rôle among the nations. The idea that the alliance with Russia was to enable her to carry on a war of revenge is not borne out by the facts and is untrue. German publicists and statesmen themselves have admitted that the alliance had in it nothing menacing to German safety. After the conclusion of the alliance, between 1891 and 1894, by means of various conventions, the German Government kept up the most amicable relations with Russia and agreements and treaties were made between them as to matters of special interest to the two countries, such as their spheres of economic influence in Asiatic Persia and in Turkey, and as late as 1910 the present Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg stated with reference to a visit made by the Emperor Nicholas to Potsdam that the result of the interview had been that

> the two nations have decided to undertake nothing which might oppose them one against the other. We have seen the disappearance of the occasions

> of misunderstanding which here and there existed and the ancient relations of confidence between Russia and Germany have been reaffirmed and strengthened.

If the German Chancellor had believed the Franco-Russian alliance to have other than a pacific and defensive character, could he possibly have made such a statement?

We have had recently much talk of an attempt to isolate Germany. This great and powerful Empire, not satisfied with its victory over France, and its dominant position in Central Europe, as a consequence of the war of 1871, concluded in 1879 with Austria and Italy the alliance known as the "Triple Alliance" and which she claimed to be a defensive pact. To this alliance France made no opposition whatever and took Germany at her word that the alliance was defensive. The present offensive character of the war was clearly indicated by the neutrality of Italy, who, if the German view of the war is correct, would have had to stand with her. The suggestion that these three great powers could be in dangerous isolation is of course quite absurd.

Down to 1895 Germany made no objection to the French policy of colonization. On the contrary Bismarck encouraged it. In speaking of French conquests in Africa he said:

We must leave the African sand to be scratched by the Gallic cock.

When the African sand, however, had been sufficiently fertilized to become valuable, it became a subject for German covetousness. In his recent work on German policy, Chancellor von Bülow states that Germany designedly left undisturbed French enterprise in Tunis and in Tonkin-China; and even in regard to the Moroccan protectorate, which so agitated German policy later on, Prince Hohenlohe declared in 1880 that Germany had no interest in Morocco and that her delegate should conform to the attitude of his colleague of France in dealing with the Sultan. No objection was made to the French expedition to Tonkin-China.

After 1895, however, when the policy of Bismarck had given place to that of the present Kaiser, who had declared that "our future is on the sea," a different attitude was adopted. The peace-loving population of France, content with the prosperity of the country, were beginning to agitate for disarmament, and never had there been so little militant feeling or such a keen desire to follow the higher dictates of humanity and dispense with the military solution of problems as when they were rudely awakened from their pacificist millennial dreams by the rattle of the Kaiser's

sabre at Tangier. At that moment the result of the battle of Mukden was known and Russia's military power was for the moment prostrate.

Was it mere coincidence that then led the Emperor to proclaim to his subjects that they must remember the battles of Wörth, Weissenburg, and of Sedan?

> I hope that peace will not be disturbed and that the events which are taking place around us will cause our eyes to see clearly and will steel our courage so that we shall be found united if it becomes *necessary to interfere in the policy of the world.*

And at Mainz in opening a new bridge, the Kaiser expresses his conviction that

> if it should have to be used for transport of a warlike nature, it will prove perfectly adapted to its work.

Up to the Russo-Japanese War, France's diplomatic situation had seemed fairly assured and if since the alliance with Russia she had not been threatened with renewed war as in 1875, it was because of this defensive alliance, by reason of which she had been able to emerge from the isolated and dependent condition in which the Treaty of Frankfort had designedly left her.

The dread of German attack and of national humiliation in the diplomatic forum had thereby been averted. Great Russian loans had been negotiated in France and international courtesies were frequently interchanged. One of Germany's most eminent apologists and the chief of her propaganda in this country has gone so far as to state that the moving cause for the entry of France into the war was fear that the loans of her citizens might be cancelled by the Russian Government if she did not draw the sword. I do not for one moment question the good faith of the distinguished ex-colonial secretary, Dr. Dernburg, who in a recent publication voiced such an opinion. It is by reason of its very good faith that it becomes significant of the complete and total inability of the powerful Teutonic intellect to understand the French mind and the French heart, either in old France or in Alsace-Lorraine. To him who knows France and the French mother, who understands the family life of her people and the close links which bind together the family units, the belief that the possibility of a mere commercial loss of certain credits would cause the nation to risk its best blood in a death struggle is altogether inconceivable; that M. Viviani, the French Prime Minister, whose son has lost his life within the last

few days on the battlefield, should have pushed the French people to war because he feared the loss of the Russian loans, that the peasant, whose little savings were invested in the Russian securities, should have sent his son to fight and die because of his interest in Russia's credit, is something so impossible to those who know France that it must emphasize the inability of the German intellect, to sufficiently understand the human heart as to have the slightest rightful claim to world dominance.

If the war were, as I believe it to have been, an effort on the part of Germany to expand her commercial power and possibilities, and to take portions of the earth's surface which did not belong to her, no such acquisitive feeling animated the French population, and when, in the first days of August of this year, men of all classes, all parties, and all shades of opinion rose as one man in defence of the national territory, the last consideration which occurred to those who went to fight, and those who remained at home to mourn, was one of a financial nature.

In 1904 France's situation was more critical than it had been since in 1875 the Czar had assured her that he would not stand idly by were she again attacked. The consequences of Russia's Man-

churian policy, had not been foreseen. French capital had gone into the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the able and brilliant M. Delcassé had apparently done nothing to divert Russia from her policy and to prevent the war with Japan.

Bitter was the disappointment in France at the news from the Far East, and the final disaster at Mukden seemed to render the Russian alliance of little value to France, and to place her again in a position of enforced isolation.

The French Foreign Office had, however, done more than effect the Russian alliance. Three centuries of conflict had divided France from England. Clashing colonial interests in all parts of the world, the memory of Egypt abandoned to the English, the unwillingness or inability of the government to support French explorers in Africa, and the final humiliation of the Fashoda incident, made any *rapprochement* between the two countries seem a feeble and hopeless dream. Yet in diplomacy it is usually the unexpected that happens. Great, therefore, was the surprise, when, on the 8th of April, 1904, the *entente cordiale* between the two countries became known, with an *éclaircissement* of all the old misunderstandings and a guaranty of friendly co-operation in the future against a disturbance in the balance of

power. The common dread of German hegemony had turned the hereditary enemies into friends, all in a day. England's reply to Emperor William II.'s appeal to the German people saying, "our future is on the sea," is to be found in the *entente* ably and tactfully initiated by that masterly diplomat—King Edward VII.

The solution of the old quarrel also involved recognition of France's peculiar situation in Morocco, and thus led to the *entente* being put to a test in short order. But M. Delcassé not only aimed at better relations with England. Italy's adherence to the German-Austrian alliance had been largely due to dislike and jealousy of France. Nations are not usually grateful. Louis Napoleon's policy of aiding Italian consolidation, without allowing the monarchy to occupy Rome, had created a condition of "gallophobia," illogical as it may seem. Subsequently, jealousy of France's extension in North Africa, and consequent widening of her influence in the Mediterranean, embittered relations. This situation was, however, due to sentiment rather than to the real interest of the nation. For Italy, "the financial consequences of the alliance with Germany were disastrous." Friendly relations with the Paris money market were potent to accomplish what Louis

Napoleon's Quixotic attitude so miserably failed to do. Thus, M. Delcassé was able to bring about a *rapprochement* with Italy, which, without modifying the text of the Triple Alliance, made it lose its edge. Italy had been led to interpret it as purely defensive and she ceased to be—by her provocative attitude—an excuse for possible German aggression. The Triple Alliance thus became

> less threatening militarily, more peaceable politically. To Germany, if attacked by France it leaves the support of the Italian army; but for an attack on France there is no longer the assistance of Italian provocations.[1]

Again, as part of the wise policy of the French Foreign Office, close relations were established with Spain. Spain's claims in Morocco, which might have been a source of international irritation, were recognized, and her aid secured to France in her endeavour to tranquillize that troubled country. Possession of Algeria and of Tunis gave France a peculiar situation. In the loosely organized, feudal condition of the Sultan's domains, constant disorder menaces the French frontier and her African possessions; profitable commercial relations cannot be developed and French capital is cut off from a valuable source of

[1] *France and the Alliances*, Tardieu.

exploitation. With this in view France and Spain agreed to recognize common interests and a rather vague understanding was entered into in the summer of 1904 that the French Republic and the King of Spain,

> having agreed to determine the extent and the guarantee of the interests belonging to France by reason of her Algerian possessions and to Spain by reason of her possessions on the coasts of Morocco, . . . declare that they remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.[1]

This was the diplomatic situation in which France found herself at the moment of the battle of Mukden. Scarcely, however, had the news reached Berlin, when the German Government, which had apparently had knowledge of, and tacitly, at least, acquiesced in, the Moroccan understanding, informed the French Foreign Office that these agreements were entered into for the purpose of isolating Germany; that they would not be considered valid without the assent of Germany, and that M. Delcassé must be dismissed and a conference called. Unfortunately M. Delcassé's work had been purely diplomatic. France had relied too much upon the justice of her

[1] *Id.*

position and a belief in the good faith of her militant neighbour. Internal dissensions and socialistic policies had weakened the French army, the Government was not prepared to fight, and the people were anxious to maintain peace. The Government, therefore, swallowed the humiliation of dismissing M. Delcassé and acquiesced in the conference plan.

Germany thus seemed to have re-established her hegemony in Europe, as in the Bismarckian time. Results of the conference showed, however, that while the Triple Alliance still stood, France was no longer isolated. Her policy and rights were practically acquiesced in by all the nations save Germany and Austria, and while the humiliation of having to dismiss her minister, and bow to the demands of Germany, was still upon her a show of hands had proved that the Triple Alliance found itself opposed by France, England, and Russia with Italy sustaining the French view, Austria alone voting finally with Germany. That the Moroccan incident was a mere pretext to batter down the diplomatic combinations which Germany seemed to feel threatened her hegemony, appears clear; but what Germany really feared was not isolation, for of that there was no danger, but rather that France should cease to be isolated

and become the centre of a combination that could diplomatically checkmate, if occasion arose, the dominant ascendancy of the "Triplice." Thus Germany then failed

> to build up, on the threshold of the twentieth century, the most extraordinary structure of political power that had ever been raised since the time of Napoleon I.; to save Bismarck's work from the assaults of ages.

The object of German policy has certainly not been to prevent her own isolation, of which there never was any probability, but rather to insure the continued isolation of France.

And yet France can scarce be blamed for having been taken by surprise at the German attitude, for as late as the 12th of April, 1904, speaking in the Reichstag Chancellor von Bülow had said:

> We have no reason to think that a Franco-English agreement will threaten any other power. What seems to have taken place is an attempt to suppress the differences which have existed between France and England by means of an amicable agreement. Against this we have nothing to complain from a standpoint of German interests.
>
> In what concerns the most important phase of this agreement, that is to say Morocco, our interests in that country, as in general in the Mediterranean, are principally of an economic order. We also

are interested in having peace and order in that country. *On the other hand we have no reason to fear that our economic interests will be disposed of or will be injured by any power.*

At that time Germany had little interest in Morocco as her commerce did not amount to more than nine per cent. of the total commerce in the Cherifien Empire.

At the Conference of Algeciras the special French rights in Morocco were recognized. Germany was given ample protection for her commercial rights and all her attempts at coercing France into parting with any of her rights in North Africa were voted down by the European powers. War was thus narrowly averted because of the patience and acquiescence of the French Government and the French people, who dismissed their minister to placate Germany and submitted their rights to the judgment of a European Congress.

Yet in 1911, the German policy of continuous aggression again manifested itself. The German Emperor announced that he would not recognize any arrangement concerning Morocco which prevented him from treating directly with the Sultan, and in 1911 a German warship was sent to seize the Moroccan port of Agadir on the pretext that the safety of German commercial interests were

imperilled by the disorders in Morocco. A German Minister is said to have declared that Agadir once occupied would never be evacuated. The crisis brought Europe once more to the verge of war and tested to the uttermost the strength of the Anglo-French *entente*.

It was made clear by the speech of Mr. Lloyd-George, evidently voicing the views of the Government, that England would not be an indifferent spectator in a quarrel foisted upon France because of Morocco and because of her understanding with England. Probably war would then have ensued had it not been for the moderation of the French Government, which, in return for rights of a purely imaginary and non-existent character, agreed to surrender to Germany a large slice of her Congo territory and thus once again buy her peace. Vast and rich territory along the river Congo was brought to aggrandize the German colony of Kamerun.

The French and English public, however, had now become painfully enlightened as to German intentions, and it was evident that peace might at any moment be troubled by the appearance of the "mailed fist." When in 1908 Austria-Hungary in violation of the Treaty of Berlin annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the German Emperor had stood,

as he said, "in shining armour" by the side of his ally to support this breach of the public law of Europe. Reverting to the preceding year (1907) we can see how natural it was that all of Great Britain's efforts for the curtailment of naval armament, and that all propositions looking towards limitation of armament at the two Hague Conferences should have been spurned by the German Government.

When, therefore, at the end of July last, Austria attempted to destroy the autonomy and self-government of Servia by forcing her to assent to a series of propositions which no independent nation could possibly have accepted, Europe was not, perhaps, surprised to see the German Emperor again standing by, "in shining armour," and evidently directing his ally; and when the ally seemed to hesitate and to meditate the acceptance of such pusillanimous methods as conference and mediation she was apparently ordered to strike with the "mailed fist."

Five days before the Austrian Ambassador left Paris, and Austria declared war against France, German advance guards had crossed the French frontier, had shot French custom officers and soldiers, and destroyed French property.

The French Government in order to avoid the

"crushing responsibility," as the Premier well termed it, of initiating such a war, several days before the termination of diplomatic relations, withdrew her troops ten kilometers from the frontier, and there they remained passive, the entire nation awaiting the attack which forty-three years of almost continuous aggression had finally taught them was inevitable.

With the immediate occasions of the war I will not deal. They have been discussed at great length in our press and the American public understands them. It is scarcely now claimed that Germany and Austria did not strike the first blow, and their invasion of Belgium and their defiance of public law and treaties has been sustained only by a plea of "necessity which knows no law." This plea of necessity in its ultimate analysis is found to be, not danger of aggression from other States, because the unpreparedness of the others has, since the war began, been made most manifest but because Germany forsooth now believes that she had been denied "her place in the Sun." Having come late into the family of nations others had taken the fair spots of the earth's surface, and her diplomacy having neglected or failed during the last thirty years to acquire sufficient colonial territory she feared lest the alliance between France

and Great Britain might exclude her from taking *vi et armis* the territory which they already owned.

The lines are thus drawn between predatory political passion and fanatical national conceit on the one hand, vested rights and elementary law and morals on the other. There can hence be no compromise and the French nation has decided with stern unanimity that the struggle must continue to the very end. An uncertain peace and another generation of national nightmare must not and will not be.

In final analysis it is impossible to discover any other explanation of Germany's course. Viewed in the light of her policy as regards Morocco, her sudden aggressive attitude toward France when Japan had defeated the Russian forces, her renewed attempts at aggression in 1911, when the solidity of the Anglo-French *entente* might have been thought questionable, her tremendous military augmentation and great war loan in 1913,—all make it clear that for years past she has meditated an aggressive war for the purpose of establishing a European hegemony, and taking by violence French and British colonial possessions. The suggestion of her responsible spokesman that if England abandoned France, Belgian neutrality and French territorial integrity would be respected, but

that no assurance could be given as to the French colonies, well demonstrates that the African soil which Bismarck contemptuously left "the Gallic cock to scratch" had grown into a coveted possession for which the German Empire was willing to risk the convulsion of a European war. The effrontery of this suggested offer to England to abandon France indicates that "Kultur" does not even recognize the existence of moral prejudice. Sir M. de Bunsen, in the report to his government, has declared that a few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. This delay was not accorded because it was thought the opportune moment to crush France completely before her too slow and less prepared allies could come to the rescue.

The consequences which must follow from a dominant public opinion based on militarism and a philosophy of force are infinite in their various and baleful ramifications. A recent German writer, formerly in the service of the General Staff, so expresses himself in regard to the United States:

> Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely different. With that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent

years, *and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part.* However as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our interests.[1]

Perhaps some day the United States will deserve punishment from Teutonic justice as much as did Belgium. If those *dies iræ* should ever come let us hope she may be better prepared than she is today to meet attack.

France is now fighting for her homes, for her civilization, for the place that she has in the world, for her ideas, for all that America fought for in 1776 and in 1860; she is fighting a defensive struggle against a great power which lives by the principle that "might makes right," and which has for years been seeking a pretext to strike.

General von Bernhardi states it without cant:

In one way or another we must settle accounts with France if we are to gain elbow-room for our own world-policy. That is the first and most absolute requirement of a sound German policy; and inasmuch as French hostility is not to be removed once for all by pacific means, that must be done by force of arms. *France must be so completely overthrown that it will never get in our way again.*[2]

[1] *Operations upon the Sea*, Freiherr von Edelsheim, p. 86.
[2] *Der nächste Krieg*, p. 114; Eng. trans., p. 105.

If that is not sufficiently clear another passage will make it clearer:

> As in 1870–71 we forced our way to the coasts of the Atlantic Ocean, so this time too we must aim at a thorough conquest in order to possess ourselves of the French naval ports and to destroy the French marine depots. It would be a war to the knife which we should have to fight out with France, a war which—if it succeeded—would crush for ever the position of France as a great power.[1]

This, at least, has the ring of manly frankness and is preferable to the pleas of apologists of uncertain nationality who would seek moral pretexts for immoral acts.

Nor does Germany's most prominent spokesman in America seem to indicate any very different attitude. Quite recently he writes:

> Geographically, Belgium does certainly belong to the German Empire. She commands the mouth of the biggest German stream. Antwerp is most essentially a German port and the main outlet of the trade of Western Germany. *That Antwerp should not belong to Germany is as much an anomaly as if New Orleans and the Mississippi delta had been excluded from the Louisiana Purchase, or as if New York had remained English after the War of Independence.*

[1] *Der nächste Krieg.*, p. 187; Eng. trans., p. 165.

Thus the "geographical theory" may be called upon to do in 1915 what the "race theory" did in 1871 for the spread of German dominion.

And again he says:

> It must be demanded, as a matter of course, that all of the colonial possessions, without exception, should be returned. But her growing population makes it absolutely imperative that Germany *should also get some territory that could be populated by whites*. At the present time she has no such colonies. In all the German possessions over the sea, in spite of efforts that have lasted for over thirty years, less than thirty thousand white people, including military, have been settled. So she must endeavour to get some such territory with a climate fit for her people. The Monroe Doctrine (which Germany has always recognized in letter as well as in spirit) forbids our seeking expansion on this side of the water, either in North or in South America. *So we will have to turn to some such place like Morocco* —if it is really fit for the purpose, which I am unable to say at this present time.[1]

The history of the last forty-three years and the initial stages of the war should make the truth plain to every impartial mind. German diplomacy was unable even to save appearances and to hide territorial greed under philosophic formula. Diplomacy had become the mere adjunct

[1] "When Germany Wins," by Dr. Dernburg, *The Independent*, vol. 77, p. 362.

of the military. It was unable to follow the advice of General Bernhardi:

> Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.

Not only might Russia have remained neutral in such a contingency, but England, where public opinion is dominant, would in all probability not have moved. It was only the ruthlessness of the attack upon France, it was only the cynical disregard of treaties that, whatever may have been the feeling of British diplomats, as to National interest, forced the peace-loving, easy-going public of Great Britain into war.

France knew that hers was the price to pay; she knew that it was upon her soil that the conflict would be waged, that it was upon her women and upon her children that the miseries of the awful war were to be felt in their full measure. She realized the strength of the opponent, the *année terrible* could not be effaced from the nation's memory. She had had experience of the weakness of democratic administration, which seemed to make for unpreparedness in war by reason of the tendency to pacificism and indifference to military qualities. She knew that with a population

twice as large as her own and a military organization more perfect than the world had yet seen in its infinite ramification of detail, the first shot must carry the enemy over that frontier which he had himself so skilfully carved with a view to its future weakness.

Military men and some statesmen suspected that German policy, based on German materialistic and non-moral philosophy, would not hesitate to destroy peaceful, neutralized Belgium, in the rush to strike at France. But I believe the mass of French people in the simplicity of their hearts felt themselves protected by treaty; the impossibility of obtaining appropriations for adequate defence of the Belgian frontier indicates that French public opinion had confidence in Germany's willingness to abide by its solemn treaty obligations.

Frenchmen did not wish for war. They accepted it as inevitable; the final certainty of the calamity came, perhaps, as a kind of a relief after the long uncertainty of years, when at short intervals of time the German menace constantly reappeared. They, therefore, accepted the war as a final and inevitable catastrophe against which they must struggle to the uttermost or die.

France is fighting for even more than its own national life.

France has been the home of ideas of liberalism, the forerunner of mankind in the great democratic experiments. Every nation whose people are moving on the road to democracy, to popular government, and to emancipation from ancient ideas of caste and of divine right, have a direct and immediate interest in France's fight.

The French are fighting today for the same ideal for which Lafayette drew his sword. In emancipating themselves and regaining their complete national autonomy they will be ridding Europe of a dread hegemony, freeing the unfortunate populations who have never ceased to mourn their lost mother since the Treaty of Frankfort, and saving the cause of every free people, liberty and law, democracy and justice.

WHAT ENGLAND IS FIGHTING FOR

By Frederick W. Whitridge



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Frederick W. Whitridge

WHAT ENGLAND IS FIGHTING FOR

WHEN I saw your poster the other day I feared you were attributing to me functions to which I have no pretensions, for, except by General Greene's nomination, I have no warrant to speak for England. Like him, I am one of the original Americans who crowded out the red Indians early in 1600. My boyhood traditions are of conversations with Washington; a man whose name I bear served on the quarter-deck with John Paul Jones; and my earliest recollections are of stories of those American frigates and privateers which for a time seem to have swept the English flag from half the seas. They did not talk about it—still less did they brag for years about the wonderful things they were going to do, in anticipation of "The Day." They simply went and did it.

In my youth, also, I studied in a German university. I left it with admiration and affection for the German people and German institutions; and I may pretend therefore that I have an open mind upon the questions to be here discussed; and

that I speak without prejudice when I say to you, as I do say, that in this war which has set the world on fire, in which the roof of civilization seems to have fallen in, it is as clear to me as the daylight, that the institutions under which most of us have been born and brought up, are imperilled by the wanton breach of the peace of the world by the German Empire; and the tales which are told, that the Germans are a simple, hard-working, God-fearing people, who were suprised by England, Russia, and France in the middle of the night, without warning, are both false and ridiculous. I know of nobody who now contends otherwise except that earnest but bewildered propagandist and seeker after the truth, Dr. Dernburg, who got out a pamphlet on the Case against Belgium, in which I believe he proved that Belgium violated her own neutrality! But on the first page of that pamphlet there is a refutation of his c rges—and it has fallen absolutely flat!

"What England is fighting for" is your question. As I see it, England is fighting for her honour and in defence of her life, her institutions, her culture, her firesides, and the temples of her gods. For her honour—you remember there was a treaty, to which England and Germany were both parties, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When

Belgium was invaded, King Albert telegraphed to England and asked for its support. What was England to do? Forty years before, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, in 1870, Lord Granville, then Mr. Gladstone's Foreign Minister, asked Bismarck what the Germans were going to do about Belgium. Bismarck answered: "Why do you ask? Have we not guaranteed its neutrality? Of course we shall respect it." When that question was asked by Sir Edward Grey of the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, last July, a very different answer was given. In the famous interview between Sir Edward Goschen, the retiring British Ambassador, and the Chancellor, after Sir Edward Goschen had stated the British position, the Chancellor apparently lost his temper and cried out: "You don't mean to say you are going to fight us for a scrap of paper? A scrap of paper, indeed!" The Bill of Rights is a scrap of paper; the Constitution of the United States, as has well been said, is a scrap of paper; the Declaration of Independence was a scrap of paper;—and the world has fastened upon that expression as containing the kernel of the whole controversy.

The question is not whether a treaty may not be broken—of course it may be broken. But the question is whether a treaty is to be regarded as

a mere move in a game—changed every hour with changing circumstances; or whether it is to be regarded as a sacred contract. Our whole civilization is based upon contracts and the possibility of enforcing them. They are sometimes broken; but what do we think of people who break them? Why, one of the marks of an honourable man is the way in which he lives up to his contracts! So when King Albert of Belgium appealed under the treaty for assistance, what could England do but what any honourable man would do—endeavour to live up to its contract—and declare war?

Now I am not going to discuss with you, or argue with you, about who struck the first blow—I take it the American people have pretty well made up their minds about that. We have given judgment against the Germans, who deliberately repudiated their plighted word, and let it be known that a solemn treaty, into which it had entered, is not worth the paper it is written on!

The case of Luxemburg, which we have heard very little about, is even worse. A treaty between Germany and Luxemburg, dated May 11, 1902, provides:

> Article 2. The imperial Government undertakes never to use the Luxemburg railroads, which are protected under imperial administration of the

Alsace-Lorrraine roads, for the transportation of troops, or arms, of material of war and ammunition; and not to use, in any war in which Germany may be involved, these roads for the provisioning of troops, in any manner incompatible with the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in general; and not to cause nor tolerate in the operation of those lines any act which might not be in perfect accord with the duties of the Grand Duchy as a neutral state.

That treaty has been violated by Germany every minute since the 1st of August—and the German state of mind about treaties is made plain.

England, having thus begun to fight for her honour, must now evidently fight for her life. In the consideration of that question, you must permit me to tell you a few things about Germany, which Dr. von Mach certainly will not tell you, but which are worth thinking about. Germany has lavished its hate upon England. The only touch of genius in any of the war productions is a chant of hate by Dr. Lissauer who got the Red Eagle for it the other day—a man who ought to be thinking of his heavenly home, but who has delivered himself of a poem which breathes a kind of fury suggestive of a madhouse.

I read, as I came here this morning, a long account of two lectures in Munich by a Berlin professor on the duty of everybody to hate England.

I never heard anything of the same kind in England. I have sometimes heard of animosity, dislike, and contempt—but I never heard anything to compare with these German expressions of hatred.

Now let us see the spirit with which the Germans began the war. The *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin, on August 3d, said:

> We begin today the final fight which shall settle forever our great position in the world, which we have never misused, and when the German sword glides again into its scabbard everything that we hope and wish will be consummated. We shall stand before the world as the mightiest nation which will then, at least, be in a position, with its moderation and forbearance, to give to the world forever those things for which it has never ceased to strive—Peace, Enlightenment, and Prosperity.

It will be a great help to us in our struggles through the world to have the victorious Germans administer those things to us. I hope it will be done pleasantly perhaps in a composite and sweetened pill.

Again, on August 18th, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Bismarck's old organ, said:

> We have taken the field against Russia and France, but at the bottom it is England we are

fighting everywhere. We must prove to Russia the superiority of our culture and of our military might. We must force France on her knees until she chokes. It is not yet time to offer terms. But between Russia and Germany there is no insoluble problem. France, too, fights chiefly for honour's sake. It is from England we must wring the uttermost price for this gigantic struggle, however dearly others may have to pay for the help they have given her.

That is the note which ran through the whole German press during the months of August and September, while I was in the position to read it, —all leading up to the oft repeated phrase: that this was the last and final "*Abrechrung*" with England. Nobody in England ever spoke of an "*Abrechrung*" with Germany. Nobody ever thought there was anything the Germans had which they wanted. And yet you hear all over Germany this parrot cry about "this war which was forced upon us by the envy and malice of our enemies." God save the mark! Envy of the Germans!! Does anybody know for what?

As to the way in which the Germans are carrying on the war, I find in a book called *Usages of the War*, published in 1902, which is referred to in Dr. Bernhardi's last book, the statement, that—

> A war cannot be conducted energetically and be confined to attacking the combatants of the enemy and its fortifications. It must at the same time be directed to the destruction of the whole of his intellectual and material resources. Human considerations—that is, the sparing of life and property,—can come into play only in so far as the nature and object of the war permit.

You all know how these doctrines have been applied to Belgium. No country for three hundred years, at least, has been ravaged and desolated like that beautiful land; and the theory about it has been candidly expressed in an article by a retired Major-General (Disfurth) in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, published early in November, which says:

> No object whatever is served by taking any notice of the accusations of barbarity levelled against Germany by our foreign critics. Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if by this we understand those who wage war relentlessly and to the uttermost degree.
>
> It is incompatible with the dignity of the German Empire and with the proud traditions of the Prussian Army to defend our courageous soldiers from the accusations hurled against them in foreign and neutral countries. We owe no explanations to anyone. There is nothing for us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act of whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of

discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a brave act and a good deed, and is fully justified.

There is no reason whatever why we should trouble ourselves about the notions concerning us in other countries. Certainly we should not worry about the opinions and feelings held in neutral countries. Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods, which in the time of war must be dictated to the world.

It is of no consequence whatever if all the monuments ever created, all the pictures ever painted, and all the buildings ever erected by the great architects of the world be destroyed, if by their destruction we promote Germany's victory over her enemies, who vowed her complete annihilation. In times of peace we might perhaps regard the loss of such things, but at the present moment, not a word of regret, not a thought should be squandered upon them. War is war, and must be waged with severity. The commonest, ugliest stone placed to mark the burial-place of a German Grenadier is a more glorious and venerable monument than all the cathedrals in Europe put together.

They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and their abuse. For my part, I hope that in this war we have merited the title of barbarians. Let neutral people and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease their talk of the cathedral at Rheims and of all the churches and all the castles in France which have shared its fate. These things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory. What else matters?

These are the theories that the Germans are reducing to practice. I know of one case of an American lady who arrived in a hotel in a frontier town on the night during which the Germans entered Belgium. She was told that nobody must open a window—the thermometer was ninety—under penalty of being shot. One man was shot in that hotel that night, and the next morning before breakfast four and twenty men and women were taken out, lined up, and shot. Léon Bourgeois, the former Prime Minister of France, found on the cathedral at Rheims this proclamation, signed by the German authorities:

> In order to secure the safety of the troops and in order to ensure calm among the population of Rheims, the persons named below have been taken as hostages by the General in command of the German army and will be shot at the least attempt at disorder; in addition, the town will be entirely or partially burned and the inhabitants hanged if a single infraction of the preceding instructions occurs.

This is followed by the names of some fifty prominent citizens.

All of this indicates a tremendous change in the German people since I knew them. They have grown rich and prosperous, but the old simplicity

of life has gone, and they are exhibiting all the defects of a crude plutocracy. They seem, moreover, to have acquired from Nietzsche a new philosophy which has thus been summarized:

> Nietzsche worshipped power. His ethics were, Do, Be, Get everything you have the strength to get. Pity is a vice. Evolution means the survival of the fittest and the destruction of the unfit. Christianity with its sympathy for the poor in spirit means decadence and is a disease. The world belongs to those who have the might to get it, and treaties, peace pacts, arbitrations, are mere points of strategy to mislead other nations. When the grim reality of war comes they all vanish and are forgotten. Indeed, sympathy for the weak, the suffering, and the power of pathos themselves are weaknesses, and might is the ultimate proof of right. The world belongs to those who can get it, and those who have broken through to these supermorals have the world that believes in the old-fashioned virtues at their mercy.

Beside that new philosophy the German organization has been wonderfully perfected and the contrast between our theory that the State belongs to the individual, and the German theory that the individual belongs to the State and is absorbed in it, is very much more accentuated and enables the Germans to organize the army, civil life, and even public opinion into an almost perfect machine

which transcends anything the world has ever seen. But, my friends, did you ever know of a machine which could think or feel, and if it were big enough did not seem ruthless and inhuman? That incapacity to think, together with the belief there is no other standard of right than might, leads to some curious results and makes the German apparently incapable of seeing things as they are, even every-day facts. Take the little matter of the truth. Nothing else than the German inability to see things as others see them could account for the ceaseless reiteration by the Germans that they had been surprised. They know that is not true.

I recall two similar cases. The other day the *New York Times* published an account of an interview with the artillery officer who had charge of the bombardment of the Rheims Cathedral, who declared that only two shots had been fired at that edifice. Richard Harding Davis, Mr. Bacon, our late Ambassador to France, and Mr. Whitney Warren, have given us accounts of the effect of those two shots on that cathedral and that town, and from their accounts it is perfectly plain that the artillery officer, interviewed by the *Times*, lied like the devil. Then take these raids on the English coast. Whenever these occur the German

authorities send out a statement that the fortified town, fortress, or what not, was attacked at such and such place, and they called Scarborough a fortified place. They must know better than that. Scarborough is no more a fortified town than Coney Island, and the five or six villages between it and King's Lynn upon which the Germans dropped bombs, I have recently seen, and they are as void of offence or the possibility of defence as the children the German bombs killed. Perhaps these official statements are covered by a Central News cable on January 5th which says:

> Admitting that the reports of the war given to the public in Germany and to neutral nations have not always been proved truthful by later developments, the *Gazette* justifies those circumstances by saying:
>
> "Circumstances often force one to deviate from the path of strict rectitude, to answer lies by lies. This is the only way to answer lies. When our troops have annihilated them we shall return to our habit of strict frankness."

I thought I knew the Germans pretty well, but this sort of thing passes my comprehension. The enormous self-satisfaction of the Germans, with their mighty organization and their heathen beliefs, leads to two or three other matters worthy of consideration.

First, They have slipped into a theatrical, cheap way of talking and acting. We have all heard of the "shining armour" and the "golden helms" and the "virgin swords," and that sort of rhodomontade; and when the German expedition first sailed to China to take possession of Kiao-Chao, the Kaiser said:

> Remember when you meet the foe that quarter will not be given, that prisoners will not be taken. Wield your weapons so that for a thousand years no Chinese will dare to look askance at a German. Pave the way once for all for civilization. Make yourselves feared as the Huns did under Attila. Good-bye, my comrades!

Suppose, now, that President Wilson, when he sent out ships to Vera Cruz last year to avenge the insult to the flag, which he afterwards condoned, had, at a dinner to the commanding officers, raised his goblet of grape juice, and said: "May every European in those distant regions, may every American merchant, and above all may the foreigner on whose soil we are, or with whom we shall have to deal, be made aware that the American Michael has finally planted his shield with the device of the American eagle upon the soil, in order once for all to give his protection to all who may ask for it. And may our countrymen in

those regions, be they merchants or be their business what it may, rest assured that the protection of the American Republic, implied by the American ships of war, will be steadily vouchsafed to them. But should any one essay to detract from our just rights, or to injure us, then up at him with your mailed fist, and, if it be God's will, weave for your youthful brow a wreath of laurel which no one in all the American Republic will begrudge you."

And suppose Brother Bryan, on behalf of the fleet, had thereupon responded:

"Most August President, Most Mighty Chief and Lord, Illustrious Brother,—One aim draws me on—it is to declare in foreign lands the gospel of your hallowed person, to preach it to everyone who will hear, and also to those who will not hear it."

I take it everybody would have said that President Wilson and Brother Bryan had suddenly become daft, wouldn't they? Yet, these are the identical words used by the Kaiser and his brother at the time of the dispatch of this expedition. How cheap it all sounds! It is like these air raids on pleasure resorts and fishing villages on the shores of the North Sea, and the submarine attacks on travellers and trading vessels. They are of

little military importance; they kill a few women and children, and now and then an old man; but the whole performance reminds me of nothing so much as the Chinese armour you see in museums, painted with demon-like faces, horns, red tongues, and formerly used by the Chinese troops in the naïve belief that the enemy would be terrified thereby.

Second, The Germans are obsessed with the delusion that they ought to have colonies and could manage a colonial empire. The loudly increasing cry in Germany for the past few years that she must have a place in the sun, means that she intends to get somebody else's place some where. I at first thought it meant we must allow without demur the individual German to steal our seats in the railway carriages and hustle and crowd our daughters away from their places in foreign galleries, but it really means that Germany must have great colonies which can relieve the pressure of her population and where the emigrants can still remain German and find, as Bernhardi says, a German way of living. Had it been written in the Book of Fate that the Germans were to be a colonial power, they would have had their colonies long ago—that is, the Germans would have gone out into the waste places in the world, settled and

improved them, and the flag of the Fatherland would have followed them. This they did not do, and, now that the earth is fully occupied, the only way in which she can get this particular place under the sun is by somehow or other getting possession of what belongs to somebody else. Conquest is an intelligible way to go about it and is apparently one of the purposes of the present enterprise, but the German Government has apparently had other ways in mind. The German interests in Morocco, for instance, were few and unimportant, yet, a short time ago, if Professor Usher is correct, the German Government endeavoured to get into that country through *agents provocateurs* in a way which was as crooked and foolish, as Admiral Diedrich's performances in Manila Bay were stupid.

Let us suppose, however, the Germans had their colonies. I consider that the German theory of government by force and the consequent German theory of regulating everything public and private —I have known a German policeman to stop a young American from whistling quietly on the street—are incompatible with the elasticity and tact essential in colonial administration, and, so far as one can judge, the Germans would be sure to make a mess of their colonies. The filthy

scandals of Dr. Carl Peters and the expense and troubles of the Herero War are not forgotten, and I remember that when Germany got one of the Samoan Islands there was the greatest difficulty in getting the Samoans, who were oiling themselves in the sun, to understand that when a German officer appeared they must stand up and salute.

The main difficulty, however, with the German colonies would be the Germans themselves. When they go out into the great world they do not want, as Bernhardi says, to find a German way of living, but they want to find a better way. I heard recently from a friend of a case in point. He met a German merchant in one of the towns of British South Africa and said to him: "What are you doing here? I should think you would be at such and such a place"—the capital town of the nearest German colony. The German replied:

> I went there, and when I got out at the station there was a German sentry with a gun. When I went to the Commissioner's house there was another sentry with a gun. After I got into the house, there was a large room all full of German red tape. So I got away and came here, where I have done very well.

The fact seems to be that the Prussian discipline which has been so exalted has done its work and

has overdone it—there are three suicides in Berlin to one in London. When a German escapes from under that discipline he never again subjects himself to its thralls, and one of the most curious things to be noted in a general survey of the world is that among all of the millions of Germans who have left the Fatherland since 1848 for this country so very few of them ever go back to Germany. It is not only that they better themselves materially, but they get a taste for the sort of freedom they never got at home. A good many German mercenaries, who enlisted here during the Civil War for the sake of the high bounties we paid for recruits, went back and are living on their pensions, and a few international bankers who never struck root here have gone back, but in a large acquaintance I have heard of only one instance where a German who had prospered returned to pass his old age at home. That was the case of a brewer who had made a few hundred thousand dollars and then built for himself a house in the German district whence he had emigrated, such as his boyhood's fancy had pictured he would have in his old age, and into that house he moved to end his days. At the end of two months he locked the front door, and said, "By God! I can't stand it another minute,"—and came back to his place in

the Middle West. He did not like what he thought was the continual interference and meddling in his private affairs.

Many years ago I was concerned in the establishment in this city of a system of free circulating libraries, and one evening the late Mr. Oswald Ottendorfer, the founder and owner of the *Staats-Zeitung* in this city sent for me and two of my associates and said he had been interested in our work, and proposed to give us a library, and stock it with German books. He went on to say:

> I intend to attach to this gift one condition. I do not deceive myself about my people at all. I am a German, and as long as there is German immigration into this country there will be a German element here, but as immigration ceases the German element will pass away. The Germans forget their language, do not keep up their ties with the old country, and in time they will as a distinct element cease to exist. I hope we shall contribute to the ultimate American some qualities of thoroughness, honesty, and good citizenship, but as an element we shall cease to be. And the condition which I have attached to this gift is that a large vault I have placed in the cellar shall be maintained as a place where the records of the German societies as they gradually die shall be preserved.

That library has long since been amalgamated with the great public library of New York. The

vault is maintained, and I believe the records of one or two German societies are already in it. Mr. Ottendorfer was right. The Germans in America are among the best, sanest, and most valuable of our citizens, but the Germans are of all people the least tenacious of their nationality. In this country the English, Scotch, and even the Irish speak of "home" for generations. The Scandinavians charter ships to go "home" to spend their Christmas; numbers of them who prosper go back to pass their old age. The Slavs go back by thousands, and have carried the English language with them, so much so that in one case an election for the Reichsrath in Austria was conducted in that language. The Italians go back by tens of thousands, and you can hardly find a town in Italy in which some one is not living in a little vineyard or *villino* who made his money in America. But, as I have said, the Germans practically never go back. They become Americans, just as they become Australians in Australia, where they are supporting their new country against the old, or they become Brazilians, Chilians, or Central Americans, and a German colonial empire is unthinkable. If it were established by theft, conquest, and force, it would be foreordained to failure because the Germans on for-

eign soil are apparently anxious to cease being German.

Third, Take the case of Belgium. The Germans seem utterly incapable of understanding what they have done in that country, or what is thought of it. I need not dwell on the horrors which have been wrought in that unhappy land. Read Cardinal Mercier's letter if you want to know about it. The plain truth is, Belgium has been outraged and violated by the German Empire, and because she refused the silver Germany offered as the price of her honour, she was flung upon the streets, literally to starve. Her assailant has allowed one State after another of this Union to send a cargo of food to the Belgians she has robbed and despoiled. What can they be thinking about? And now on top of all this, the German authorities in Belgium are allowed to defend themselves against the German charge of *too great leniency*. Think of it!! German *leniency* in Belgium!

The *New York Times* publishes a despatch saying:

> The German semi-official organ, *The North German Gazette*, published, on January 2, a long article from Brussels defending the German military authorities in Belgium from the charge of undue leniency to the Belgian population. The following are some salient passages:
>
> "A strong hand must combine with a just spirit

to govern a country under the conditions now existing in Belgium. Every exaggerated form of mildness and all sentimentality must be avoided and will be avoided, but true strength will always be just; it will be rigid if need be, but never unnecessarily harsh. Adherence to such principles is in the conqueror's own interest.

"The German Government in Belgium is doing its utmost to restore old-time economic conditions and to give the working classes employment and bread, not in order to be kind to Belgium, but to avert the possibility of famine and disease behind the front of our army endangering its security and health. Germany has, therefore, gladly permitted provisions to be brought in from neutral countries in order to spare domestic supplies and preserve our troops from shortage of supplies.

"Critics of our mildness should ask themselves how Belgium is to perform the financial obligations laid upon her if her life nerves are crippled. It is the right of the victor and a duty to his own army, to compel the country to pay money tribute which without prejudice to a later war indemnity shall be taken from the country in the form of contributions.

"We now demand the payment by Belgium of 600,000,000 francs within a year. In the eyes of many people this sum seems ridiculously small. In truth, however, it represents the present outside limit of the financial capacity of Belgium which has suffered so heavily from the war."

That is, they ask only for everything they can possibly get.

The conscience of the whole civilized world has been stirred as never before by the German proceedings in Belgium. We pour out our charity now, but by-and-bye, we shall applaud whatever vengeance may be exacted.

Fourth, Germany has hugged to herself the most foolish delusions about her antagonists. England they thought a decadent power, they believed there would be civil war in Ireland, rebellion in India, Egypt, and South Africa, and they absolutely cannot understand how it is that none of these things has happened. Their god of force seems only a tin god. They will not understand that in India there are 270,000,000 people governed by only eight hundred white men who have been lavish in their offers of support; that in Canada, Australia, and colonies all over the globe which are bound to the mother country by little more than a flag and a language, there have been poured out money and men to resist their precious "Kultur." The machine-made public opinion of Germany falls down in the endeavour to account for these wonders, and shrieks in hate over the peoples who work them.

I know only one man who seems to see clearly and be willing to speak and acclaim the brutal truth about his country and his people—

that is Maximilian Harden, the editor of the *Zukunft*.

> Let us drop [he says] our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture. We willed it. We had to will it. We do not stand before the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods will praise the God of War.
>
> Germany is not [he continues] making this war to punish sinners or to free oppressed peoples, and then to rest in the consciousness of disinterested magnanimity. She sets out from the immovable conviction that her achievements entitle her to demand more elbow room on the earth and wider outlets for her activity.
>
> Germany's hour has struck [he says] and she must take her place as the leading power. Any peace which does not secure her the first position would be no reward for her efforts.

That is the state of mind England is fighting. It is maintained by the Germans with unexampled ardour, and fight England must if she would live.

Now, my friends, I have said as much about this hideous struggle as I have time to say, and, so far as possible, I have presented the situation in the language of the Germans themselves. I find

it pathetic that the Germans, about whom I feel as I should about an old friend who has gone out of his mind, should be guilty of such dreadful delusions, and to be so incapable of understanding what people must think of them. I feel that it is necessary for the future peace of the world, for the preservation of small nations, for the maintenance of the kind of liberty we enjoy, and in order that popular government should not perish from the earth, that the Germans should not be destroyed but should be confessedly and decidedly whipped.

I, in my youth, lived through the Civil War, which was fought for four weary years for the destruction of human slavery, and I hope I shall live long enough to see this war carried on until the Prussian militarism and the pagan creeds behind it which holds in slavery the mind of a great people shall be absolutely destroyed. When I think of the precious lives which have gone, and of the other young lives which are to go before that end can be reached, it nevertheless seems to me, heart-breaking though it be, that the sacrifice is worth while if it can accomplish that purpose, prevent the recurrence for the next generation of a peace which is only an armed and extravagant peace, and enable mankind to go on with its appointed labours.

WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR

By Dr. Edmund von Mach

Photo by Marceau, Boston

E. W. Peck

WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR[1]

In the first place, I wish to thank the presiding officer for his last remarks, because every German-American feels that the very moment he swears allegiance to his new country, that is the country which is for him *über alles*. And then I wish to thank also you, Sir [turning to Mr. Whitridge], for the tribute which, perhaps unintentionally, you have bestowed on the Americans of German descent of whom you said, that they always become passionately attached to their new homes. I am only sorry that I cannot return this compliment in kind. Two years ago the British Consul in Boston told one of his colleagues that he had in his consular district 600,000 British subjects who had no intention of taking part in the political life of our country or of becoming American

[1] Some of the arguments of this address are based on Dr. von Mach's previous writings, notably his "German Viewpoint" in the Wednesday editions of the Boston *Evening Transcript*, and his book, *What Germany Wants*, Little, Brown & Co., publishers, who have kindly permitted the use of some of the copyrighted material of Dr. von Mach's book.

citizens. Many of these British subjects have connected themselves with the staffs of our great Eastern newspapers, and are found on our college faculties. This fact you should remember, when you read your newspapers, and hear of pro-English college faculties. In every case you should ask yourselves how many of these writers and orators are British subjects, unable to speak from an American heart, and capable only of giving voice to their political hatred of the German Empire.

If I were not an American, but just simply a German, I should not deign to reply to these two eloquent gentlemen and what they have told you. For *qui s'excuse s'accuse*, and Germany needs no defence. As an American, however, I feel it my duty to tell my fellow-citizens that they are grievously mistaken. A public opinion which is based on falsehoods may ruin a nation. And I want to see America thrive.

Mr. Coudert has given evidence of that wonderful French eloquence which can make a brilliant case although the facts on which it should be based are lacking. No people know better than the men and women of Buffalo that he was mistaken when he claimed that the inhabitants of Alsace had been and still were French to the core. How many

people from Alsace came here in the fifties, long before the German annexation of 1871? Was not Mr. Haberstro from Alsace? Did he not found in Buffalo—what? A French-American bank? No, a German-American bank. And all the other people who came from Alsace, and founded a German singing society, the Orpheus, did they call themselves French? By no means. And why not? Because they were and always had been German at heart. Politically they were French at that time, because Louis XIV.—and inadvertently the eloquent speaker, in going from the present time to the orang-outang, forgot to stop with Louis XIV.—because Louis XIV. went over the border and stole those beautiful provinces from Germany. When in 1871 Germany took them back again, she had the moral right to do so, but I fully agree that there was a momentous question which had to be decided, because in this world if we never made any changes, then, as the previous speaker has said, we should still be living at the level of the orang-outang.

The restoration of these provinces to Germany, who believed it to be an act not only of justice but also of necessity, raised the question whether Germany would be able to govern them to their own satisfaction. Has she done this? Mr. Cou-

dert's eloquence says No. The facts, however, —and I would rather base my case on facts than on rhetoric,—say Yes. Alsace-Lorraine elects fifteen delegates to the Reichstag. At first, in 1873, only one man was elected who represented a distinctly German party. The others preferred to call themselves more or less French. In the last election to the Reichstag two French and thirteen German delegates were elected! With this statement I believe I can leave this question, and consider it answered in the affirmative.

It was exceedingly interesting to sit here and wait for the proofs of that terrible accusation which Mr. Coudert made against Germany. I was waiting to hear him quote the facts from the official French *Yellow Book* but, so far as Mr. Coudert was concerned, Mr. Jules Cambon might have saved himself the trouble of editing the official dispatches by which the French Government had hoped to prove its case. This was significant, for, as you may have noticed, the French *Yellow Book* has been entirely dismissed of late, although its first publication was heralded as a godsend for the British and French advocates who wished to bolster up their cases with facts. There are enough facts in the French *Yellow Book*, but they do not jibe with the British *Blue Book*, and the edict

seems to have been issued to ignore the *Yellow Book*. You will find no mention of it in any pro-British paper, not even the one which the previous speaker regards with so much veneration.

Why is it that the French *Yellow Book* has disappeared? Because an eloquent Frenchman, M. Jules Cambon, who happened to be thoroughly mad at the time, edited it. He was eagerly looking for any dispatches that might contain anti-German statements, and was so hypnotized by his hatred of Germany that he could not see anything but what was anti-German. Dispatch after dispatch, therefore, was included in this garland of truth and fiction which contains the most damaging admissions to the pro-ally cause. As a matter of fact the French *Yellow Book*[1] proves that Germany is absolutely innocent. And everything that the first speaker has said about Germany being the aggressor, is proved, on the very records of the Frenchmen themselves, to have been in error.

Let us mention just one thing. The French *Yellow Book* makes this statement: "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco"—a mere diplomatic dispatch from the French Embassy in Berlin to the head of the Foreign Office

[1] For a full discussion of the *Yellow Book* see the Boston *Evening Transcript*, Feb. 3, 10, and 17, 1915.

in Paris, "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco!" To me that does not look as if Germany had threatened France in the Morocco case, and as if Germany had been trying to get away from France that soil which "under the scratching of the proud Gallic Cock had suddenly turned fertile."

The speaker also made the statement that Germany had attacked France. It is quite true that Sir Edward Grey, in No. 105 of his *Blue Book*, adds, as No. 3, a dispatch from Paris which tells how the wicked Germans had attacked France, but most unfortunately for Sir Edward Grey his dispatch was dated July 30th, and the French letter which he enclosed, and by which he hoped to prove his case, was dated July 31st. After he had published these letters he noticed his mistake, and therefore omitted the date of the French dispatch of July 31st in the second edition of the *Blue Book*. But after the second edition had been issued, it was noticed that another mistake had been made, because the dispatch itself contained the words "yesterday, Friday." Therefore in the next edition Sir Edward Grey ordered "Friday" crossed out. But even this left the dispatch inaccurate, because it referred to the mobilization of Germany as having taken place on

"Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in." Unfortunately this note was not presented on Saturday, but on Thursday. In the fourth edition, therefore, which Sir Edward Grey published, he had to print a little footnote which said that Saturday was written, but that, of course, Thursday was meant.

It is really amusing that such things should happen in a book by which the previous speaker and the Hon. Mr. Beck swear as if it contained the gospel truth. But it is not amusing that intelligent people should go on believing in such documents when a little study would reveal their untrustworthiness. And by no stretch of the imagination can we condone the procedure which attempts to doctor an important document which is supposed to place the responsibility for the war. To me the falsification of this dispatch means that there is absolutely no truth in it; and there is fortunately one other definite indication that even France knew that Germany had not begun mobilizing on July 30th. While the French *Yellow Book* is full of those dispatches, beginning with about July 27th, which claim that German troops are gathering here and troops are gathering there, and that Germany is mobilizing and France is going to be attacked, and while those dispatches

were collected and sent over to Sir Edward Grey, with the request that he present them to his Cabinet and induce Great Britain to join France in a war against Germany, there is, fortunately for the lovers of truth, one dispatch which proves that Viviani at least, the French Premier, knew that the other dispatches were lies, every one of them. The dispatch to which I refer is No 101 of the *Yellow Book*, a message from M. Viviani to his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, which says that Russia "should take no immediate steps which might offer to Germany a pretext for the total or partial mobilization of her forces." In other words, on July 30th M. Viviani knew that Germany had not begun even a partial mobilization, and yet he sent these lying dispatches to Great Britain, and it is these dispatches which Sir Edward Grey presented to the British Cabinet!

What would the French not give if they could recall this one damaging dispatch, for it has let in the vigorous breath of truth, and has shattered at one blow the carefully reared structure of falsehoods which represented the Germans as mobilizing long before they did. But there are other and even more damaging dispatches which throw a light upon the French and English dealings in the

last days before the war which must fill every honest pro-ally with shame.

You remember how the story goes, in dates, according to the *Blue Book*. On August 1st the German Ambassador came to Sir Edward Grey and said, "If we promise not to do this and this, will you stay neutral?" Sir Edward Grey was unwilling to enter into any agreement. Finally Germany said, "Cannot you offer any terms under which Great Britain will stay out of the war?"

Has it occurred to you to inquire why Sir Edward Grey did not say, "Yes, if you do not go through Belgium we will stay out?" That is what England did in 1870. If Belgium really was the *casus belli* for Sir Edward Grey, why didn't he say that? What was Sir Edward Grey's answer? Sir Edward Grey said, in substance, on August 1st, according to his *Blue Book*: "I cannot bind myself. We must keep our hands free." And on August 2d, in the afternoon, the British Cabinet voted to go with France, and on August 3d there came that magnificent speech of Sir Edward Grey in Parliament, in which he announced the decision of the Cabinet of the previous day.

Now please turn to the French *Yellow Book*,

and watch the course of events. On July 31st, Sir Edward Grey gave his personal promise to Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, that he would support France in this war, and then he went to the Cabinet meeting where the greatest surprise was in store for him, for the British Cabinet, with Morley and Burns still present, voted against going to war! And what happened then? Search through the *Blue Book*, search through the *Yellow Book*. Up to that moment Belgium had not been mentioned, but at this juncture Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon put their heads together and said, it seems: "Let us frighten Germany with Belgium, let us get the Belgian question up and we may be able to swing the Cabinet." Now for the first time Belgium appears, and the question is put to France and Germany, "What do you intend to do in this particular war as regards Belgium?"

On August 1st Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon met again. It was before the Cabinet meeting, and for the second time—mind you, on August 1st—Sir Edward Grey promised the English support to France, and from that meeting, having given his promise for the second time to Paul Cambon, he stepped up to Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador and said: "I cannot formu-

late any conditions under which we will keep neutral, because we must keep our hands free!" Then he went to the Cabinet meeting, and—God bless the honourable British gentlemen who were still in the Cabinet, Morley and Burns!—and for the second time the British Cabinet voted against the war! Not until after the unfortunate German reply had been received on the next day, when Germany knew no doubt that Sir Edward Grey had given his promise to France and that England would go to war under one pretext or another, did the British Cabinet vote in favour of supporting France in the war.

This is the great irony of fate, that the British Cabinet voted for a war against Germany because Germany had felt obliged to do what she would not have done if she had not known or suspected that Sir Edward Grey had twice promised his support to Paul Cambon. I believe that the British Cabinet, the majority of them, and the British people, were absolutely honest. The majority of them believe to this day that they are fighting Germany because Germany broke a treaty with Belgium, a treaty which in 1913 not even Sir Edward Grey claimed to be any longer in force!

I agree most heartily with the previous speaker who called the hatred against the British

people that has sprung up in Germany most regrettable. I even would urge all of you who still have connections across the water to endeavour to put clearly before them the fact that it was not the British Cabinet, and not the British people, who really attacked Germany, but that it was a combination of circumstances resulting from the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey.

Personally Sir Edward Grey may be a man of honour, whose very word meant more to foreign nations than written contracts. When he gave his word to Paul Cambon, France felt sure that he would find the means to redeem it. Sir Edward's word bound England as securely as a treaty, while, there not being a treaty, Sir Edward could assure Parliament time and again that no French treaty existed.

The English-German War came at a most unfortunate time, because latterly the Germans and the British had really begun to understand each other somewhat after years of mutual suspicion.

It would be difficult to say who first hurled defiance at the other, but when the previous speaker said that he knew of no instance when England had demanded an *Abrechnung* (accounting) of Germany, he showed how woefully little he knows of the subject. As a sample of the

Abrechnung demanded by England I shall read to you a few excerpts from the *Saturday Review* of September, 1897. The writer complains that the Germans are the rivals of the English in the commerce of the world everywhere, and continues:

> A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred million pounds of commerce?

That is only one of the challenges flung across the Channel, and how the speaker can say that Great Britain had not said such things, I fail to understand, or rather I should have failed to understand, if his entire address had not been composed of assertions none of which he is able to back up by facts. Because the pro-ally papers print an assertion, he believes it. And he has apparently never taken the pains of searching for the truth himself. He said that the Germans had broken the law of nations by bombarding an unfortified town when they bombarded Scarborough. There are two mis-statements in this assertion. In the first place, Germany has claimed, not that Scarborough was not an un-

fortified, but not an undefended, town. I take it, Sir, that you know your French, and will be able to read The Hague Convention, in the original. It is there written that "it is forbidden to bombard ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are not being defended." The substitution of *unfortified* for *undefended* is a trick of the pro-English press.

So much for the first mistake. The second lies in your assumption that Scarborough was an undefended town, because the press said so. My word may not go very far with you, but you may be willing to take the word of Lothar de Bunsen, cousin of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had been the British Ambassador in Vienna. Shortly before the attack on Scarborough, Lothar de Bunsen wrote: "Here we have continual scares of invasion—much to the joy of Bernard and Ronald. The whole coast is an armed camp, and one does not know what will happen." You didn't know that, Sir. And that is the saddest part of this whole affair, that honourable people, like these two speakers, who read only pro-English papers,[1] have no opportunity

[1] A reference to the report that Lord Northcliffe of the London *Times* had invested two million dollars in American newspapers has been omitted here, because Mr. C. R. Miller of the N. Y. *Times* has informed the writer that the report is not true.

of getting the truth, and have never yet thought it worth their while to insist that the papers they read print the truth.

The previous speaker has enlarged on the atrocities said to have been committed by the Germans in Belgium. You have all read fulsome accounts of them, and probably know that several months ago the British Government was forced by some honourable men in Parliament to appoint a commission to investigate these stories of atrocities. But what you do not know, and what the previous speaker does not know, is that this commission has reported, and has found it impossible to substantiate one single charge of atrocity against the Germans. So far as I know, only two New York papers have commented on this fact. All the others have suppressed this report. (*Cf.* New York *World* January 28th.)

Another report has not been given the prominence it deserved, for it came from our own State Department, and said that an American diplomat, just returned from the war-zone, had said that he had investigated the atrocity-stories and that there was not one iota of truth in them. But, Sir, if you believe those stories, I do not wonder that the Germans are, to you, those terrible people you have depicted.

I came this morning on the train with one of your fellow-townsmen who has just been honourably discharged from the cruiser *Chester*. He was in Vera Cruz. In the same car with us was a corporal from Niagara Falls. I introduced those two gentlemen to each other. Said the corporal: "That was some mighty fine shooting you did in Vera Cruz; why, the way you took the steeple off that beautiful old church was perfectly magnificent." "Yes," said the other, "but that was nothing compared to the way we fired our shells right into the Marine Academy only a foot over the heads of our own soldiers. With a few shots we destroyed the whole building; the library and everything went at once." "And," said the other, "did you see that Pedro, or whatever his name was?" Then I spoke up and asked, "Who was Pedro?" "Oh, Pedro was that Mexican cadet, who stuck to his gun and kept on firing when around about him everything was in ruin, and every Mexican was killed." What did the Americans do? Did they go to that brave man and ask him to surrender? No. They shot him. But in their honour let it be said, they gave him a splendid funeral, to which all the citizens, men, women, and children, turned out in force. Somehow the courage and patriotism of this Mexican

lad and the appreciation of these qualities shown by his fellow-citizens have given a rosier tinge to my whole view of the Mexican people.

But here is another instance of our way of waging war. When the *Chester* dropped anchor in Vera Cruz harbour, there were other ships there, one of which flew a Mexican flag, while another had broken out the Union Jack. Suddenly the British captain signalled to the *Chester:* "The Mexicans are firing on you with revolvers." Thereupon a shot was fired into the Mexican ship, and a boatload of jackies sent over to take the men prisoners. Five men were found on the half wrecked ship. Three had revolvers, the other two were unarmed, although additional revolvers were found in the cabin. All five, therefore, were stood up and shot!

I do not tell these stories to condemn our brave soldiers and sailors. They had orders to take Vera Cruz, and it was the duty of the officers in charge to take all necessary precautions, however harsh, to protect the lives of their soldiers. Some things were done in Vera Cruz exactly like what has happened in Belgium—for instance the breaking in of the doors of houses from which shots had been fired at our soldiers. If resistance was offered, the occupants of the houses were shot.

But such are the horrors of war. How would we feel, I wonder, if a man, who knew better, should write a book on The Americans in Vera Cruz, and fill it with exaggerated accounts of actual events and a liberal amount of falsehoods; and if thereupon the most scurrilous attacks should be made on our President; and the honour of our women and leading men be dragged into the gutter, and our fathers and brothers be called barbarians, and our mothers and sisters be insulted? We too would rise in vigorous protest, and it would not matter whether English, French, German, or Russian blood flowed in our veins!

But I assure you that there is no more reason to condemn the Germans for their warfare in Belgium than the Americans for what they did in Vera Cruz, the unsubstantiated assertions of Mr. Whitridge or any other pro-ally notwithstanding. And such assertions come with especially poor grace from those who would defend England. England! the country which through the sixty-three years of the reign of Queen Victoria had not one single whole year of peace! England, the country that has subdued India, Egypt, Africa, not to speak of Ireland and parts of America, by a mode of warfare the cruelty of which can be characterized only with the one word "inhuman."

War! War! War! The previous speaker has mentioned Bernhardi. I wonder whether he has ever studied the writings of Major Stewart L. Murray of the British Army, to one of whose books Lord Roberts said in 1905 that he was pleased to write a preface because it was such a magnificent book? Let me read you only one passage from this book, *The Peace of the Saxons*. Quoting from an earlier book an account of England's sudden attack on the Danish islands in 1807, Captain Murray writes:

> On July 26th our fleet sailed from the Downs. In the words of the Danish declaration, the Danish Government saw the English ships of war upon the coast without even a conjecture that they were going to be employed against Denmark. The island of Zealand was surrounded and captured, the capital threatened, the Danish territory violated and injured before the Court of London had made use of a single word to express the hostility of its feelings. In a time of peace we surprised a friendly nation, landed an army, bombarded its capital, seized its fleet [and they did not return it], and all its naval stores, which we carried off to England.

This is the quotation, and now Major Stewart Murray, with the approval of Lord Roberts, goes on to say:

> I quote this incident without comment to show how utterly unconventional, even if necessary and

> expedient our action was. Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it. Therefore we did it.

The eloquent gentleman behind me [Mr. Coudert] says, and you will permit me to repeat his interpolation so that all may hear it: "Quite right for that time," but now let me finish my reading and add what in 1905 this major in the British Army, with the full approval of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, added:

"And are we ashamed of it? No, certainly not. We are proud of it."

You can search the whole of the pestilential war literature of Germany or of any other country except England, and nowhere will you find anything approaching the defiance of all morality which characterizes the writings of Major Stewart L. Murray or of that other great protagonist of the Anglo-Saxon race, Homer Lea, who, though by birth an American, wrote for the English, and met the approval of Lord Roberts, who accepted the dedication of Lea's the *Day of the Saxon.* Lea's admiration of England was unbounded, and glorying in what other people would wish to gloss over, he wrote:

> By wars and conquests, by theft and intrigue, by the same brutal use of physical power, was it [the British Empire] put together, piece by piece.

And we all know that this is true!

I was asked to speak on Why Germany is at war, but if I had not replied to the attacks of the previous speakers you might have believed that no defence was possible. There are on this platform three allies to one Teuton, but thanks to his German training this one Teuton was prepared with the facts which he would have foreborne to use if the Frenchman and the Britisher had not attacked him. You have here a reflection, as it were of the real events in Europe, where Germany is fighting against tremendous odds; about one to six so far as the numbers of the inhabitants of the countries at war are concerned, and one to more than thirty if you count the square miles of the world's surface on the resources of which the combatants can draw!

France is fighting with that brilliancy and verve which make one like one's opponent and wish he were one's friend, while England is trying to forge ahead with that ruthlessness and assumption of moral superiority which exasperates her opponents, and is meant to win the favour of those who from a distance cannot see everything in its true light.

Germany has nothing but her efficiency, and a firm belief that at this particular juncture she has not only been wantonly deceived and attacked, but has also been exposed to the world by unfair diplomatic means as if she, and not Russia and Sir Edward Grey, had been the author of this war.

People most generally like to believe, said Cæsar of old, what they wish to believe. And none of us can be persuaded against his will. Instead of arguing, therefore, that Germany is at war because she was threatened with an attack which endangered her very existence, I prefer to call your attention to a few considerations, which seem to indicate that she had least to gain by war, and that even the most remarkable victories on the battlefield could not secure for her what another generation of peace would have dropped as a ripe fruit into her lap.

1. Germany's financial condition was excellent. According to the July number of the *Journal of the* [British] *Royal Statistical Society*, the per capita debt of the United Kingdom is about $80, with no assets, while the German per capita debt is about $76, with so many assets in the shape of state railways, mines, farms, forests, etc., that the assets exceed the liabilities by far, and more than wipe them out.

2. Germany's commerce was so flourishing that it had increased recently according to the same *Journal* 204 per cent. while the British commerce had increased during the same time only 100.7 per cent. When England took two steps in advance, Germany took three; and already Germany stood where England had been only ten years ago.

3. Germany's population grew much more rapidly than the English and the French, which latter was practically stationary. The German excess of births over deaths has averaged recently 800,000 annually, while her emigration had practically stopped. The English emigration continued at the rate of from 200,000 to 300,000, with practically no immigration. Germany, on the other hand, had, in addition to her natural growth of population, an immigration of several hundred thousand.

4. The German industry was so perfectly developed that it could meet the demands which were made upon it, namely to feed each year about one million mouths more than it had fed the previous year.

5. The German labour conditions were so satisfactory, thanks to the German welfare legislation, that poverty as it is known in Liverpool and

London did not exist in Germany, and that there were no "slums" in any of the large German industrial centres.

6. The German army and navy were far less of a burden on Germany than the English, French, or even Russian armaments were on their respective taxpayers. The English paid more than 60 per cent. more than the Germans, and the French about forty per cent. more annually.

7. The German Emperor had won the respect and personal affection of all classes of society, even of those parties who, like the Socialists, are on principle opposed to any form of government except a socialistic democracy.

He was known to be a man of peace not only at home, but also abroad, as was shown by the many testimonials from men of prominence at his twenty-fifth anniversary as German Emperor.

8. The commercial relations of Germany with all the peoples of the world were excellent and promised a constantly growing ratio of increase in Germany's share in the markets of the world.

9. Germany's merchant marine was growing by leaps and bounds. The largest ships afloat were German, thanks to the wonderful development of her steel and iron factories, the largest of which are the Krupp works. The gun factories of the

Krupps comprised only a small part of the total establishment, which was largely given up to industrial purposes.

This flourishing German merchant marine, protected by an efficient although comparatively small navy, was the greatest thorn in the flesh of the English, who called their own navy a necessity for themselves, and the German navy a luxury for their cousins across the Channel. The Germans were never quite able to see it in that light, and seem to have said to the English:

> Dear cousins of Albion, you may have no designs on our merchant marine and our commerce, but you will forgive us, if we judge you not only by your present protestations but also by your record as it stands revealed on the pages of history.

And being good students of history, the Germans knew that Spain once had a flourishing merchant marine and that in the hour of need her fleet failed her, and the English took her commerce away from her. Later the same thing happened with Holland, and with France, and with the United States. In each case there was no sufficient navy to protect the country's commerce, and England took possession of the commerce and the merchant marine of one country after the other.

Germany alone was left as an English rival on the sea; and can you blame her for wishing to have a navy and be on the safe side? Spain, Holland, France, and America, all had been obliged to yield their merchant marines and the best part of their commerce to England, who had thus made herself the first nation on the globe of the world.

For several generations she has held this predominant position, but whichever way the war will go, she is bound to lose it. Those were prophetic words which the Chairman used in introducing Mr. Whitridge, "England next." Yes, Mr. Chairman, "England next, and never again first! Her fair dream of world dominion is shattered forever. Her magnificent notion that she is the mistress of the sea and that all others sail the oceans only on suffrance, has played her false. Her pleasant conceit that she can oppress people, big or small, black, white, or yellow, in any corner of the globe, and can yet play the part of the protector of the small nations, has been pricked like a bubble. In the past she has maintained her position by fight and intrigue. In the future she will have to work on equal terms with all the rest. After this war there will be no aristocracy of nations. All will stand on an equal footing.

Long after the details of the present war are forgotten, when friendship reigns again among the peoples of this world, and someone asks: What did the nations fight for in 1914? The man who knows will reply: Germany fought to break down the outworn order of things. America and France had fought and suffered, a century and more before, to establish the right of freedom of the individual, Germany fought to secure the right of freedom and natural growth of nations. She suffered much, but she won for the world justice and liberty, and established among the nations what had long been in force among individuals—"the efficiency test of superiority"!

WHY JAPAN IS IN THIS WAR

By Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga

Photo by Kikuchi, New York



WHY JAPAN IS IN THIS WAR[1]

In spite of General Greene's explanation I cannot yet understand why I happen to be the last speaker this evening, at this late hour when your thoughts turn to the place of refuge for rest and quiet after these heated discussions. Perhaps it is because Japan entered the war last. If so, I will assure you, she will not be the last to quit the bloody scene, but will leave it at the same time and in company with her ally.

At the outset it is meet for me to say that the Japanese people, while Japan is at war with Germany, harbour no feelings of enmity toward the Germans. On the contrary, they entertain the highest admiration and warm friendly feeling toward the German people. That this friendly feeling is genuine is sufficiently demonstrated by the courtesy and kindness shown toward German prisoners and German subjects residing in Japan.

[1] Part of this address is reprinted through the courtesy of Doubleday, Page & Company and the Review of Reviews Company, who published it in *Europe at War*.

The Japanese people have learned through centuries of discipline to make a clear distinction between personal friends and the enemies of the State, and have been trained by the codes of Bushido to be courteous and generous even to their foes. No better testimony of this can be given than this most striking fact,—that the Chinese became more friendly to us after the China-Japan War, and the Russians became more friendly to us after the Russo-Japanese War, and I will assure you who are from Germany, not only German subjects but of German extraction and of German sympathy, that the Germans will become more friendly to us after this war. The bitterness shown among the belligerents of Europe toward innocent non-combatants, which is carried even to the extreme of impairing personal friendship, strikes us as being due to a lack of catholic spirit and self-restraint.

It follows, therefore, that whatever condemnation I may see fit to pronounce later on of German methods refers solely to the German Far Eastern policy engineered by German bureaucracy and militarism.

To comprehend fully the real significance of Japan's participation in the great war, a firm and comprehensive grasp of the Far Eastern situa-

tion is necessary. I shall endeavour to-night to review the history of the Far East so far as it directly concerns my subject, and examine the spirit and working of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with the hope of making clear the grounds upon which Japan's war with Germany rests.

The conflicting policies pursued by Japan and Germany in the Far East which have at last resulted in the present war, had their inception at the time of the China-Japan War of 1894–5. When Ito and Mutsu concluded at Shimonoseki the negotiations of the Peace Treaty with Li-Hung-Chang, they felt jubilant at the thought that Japan had scored a victory in diplomacy no less brilliant than those on land and sea. The wily Chinese diplomat, on the other hand, must have been laughing in his sleeve that he had outwitted his rivals, for, no sooner had peace terms been made known than Ito, Japan's Premier at that time, was confronted by a joint note addressed by Russia, France, and Germany to the Mikado, counselling him to renounce his claim to the Liaotung Peninsula. This was urged on the plea that the retention of the peninsula by Japan would be a standing menace to the capital of China and the peace of the Orient. The note was couched in most polite terms, as polite as the one Japan addressed to

Germany on August 16th, but its meaning was unmistakable. The chagrin of Ito knew no bounds; he remained, it is said, mute for three long days. How Ito felt is well described by Sir Valentine Chirol:

> I was in Japan then [says he] and in the course of a conversation with Prince Ito, that great statesman, usually so reticent and reserved, brought his fist down on the table and exclaimed: "Germany we shall never forgive! Russia looks upon us as a future rival in the Far East; France is, of course, her ally, and has important possessions and ancient interests in Eastern Asia—we can understand their action. But for Germany, which always professed such genuine friendship and has no special interests in those regions, to join hands with them and stab us in the back—her intervention was odious and gratuitous."

It took Japan, however, not many years to discover the real motive of Germany in joining the European Coalition. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered by a Chinese mob in the Shantung Province of China. This was immediately seized upon as a pretext, and on the 14th of the same month German warships entered the harbour of Kiao-chau, landed their marines and hoisted the German flag on the fort of a friendly sovereign Power. Then reparation

was demanded from Peking. And remarkably drastic were its terms, namely: 200,000 taels of silver on account of the dead men; rebuilding of a chapel destroyed in the riot; reimbursement of expenses incurred by Germany in occupying Kiao-chau; and severest penalties for the assassins and local officials. And on top of these demands Germany required Kiao-chau as a naval base; to be granted exclusive coal-mining rights in Shantung; also to receive railway concessions in that province. Since Cain killed his brother the world has never seen or heard of such an extraordinary demand as this reparation for the murder of two holy apostles of the gospel! As a matter of fact, Germany had for some time past been casting a longing eye on the China coast to find a shelter for her navy in order to use it as a strong weapon for the prosecution of her Far Eastern programme. The murder of the two German subjects by a Chinese mob was, therefore, the God-sent opportunity for the Kaiser. And, because of the debt China felt she owed to the German service in saving Liaotung Peninsula, most of the above demands were soon acceded to.

In March, 1898, the Kiao-chau Convention was signed. By its terms Germany secured the lease of Kiao-chau for ninety-nine years, and the

right to build forts and dockyards and construct light-houses and beacons.

Within the succeeding decade and a half Germany undertook a vast scheme of harbour construction and transformed the silt-laden Bay of Kiao-chau into a splendid naval base. She built the beautiful city of Tsing-tao; planted trees on the barren hills surrounding it; established many factories therein and made it a flourishing port. She fortified it by strong lines of fortifications, until Kiao-chau became the greatest stronghold of any Occidental Power in the Far East. She developed the resources of the Shantung Province, Kiao-chau's hinterland, by building railroads, opening mines, and encouraging agriculture.

In short, Kiao-chau was the centre and base of German activity in China, politically and commercially. It was intended as a beginning of a vast imperial-colonial-commercial programme which Germany had formulated to carry out in China.

To capture this stronghold of Germany in the Far East, and to destroy the warships that preyed upon British merchantmen, was then the duty that was imposed upon Japan when she was called by her ally to her assistance.

The operations on land and sea which Japan

undertook are still fresh in your memory. Let me summarize them here:

On August 16th, Japan sent to Germany an ultimatum to evacuate Kiao-chau and withdraw her warships from the Eastern Seas. The time limit having expired on August 23d, Japan declared war against Germany on the same day. Four days later the Japanese fleet completed the blockade of the harbour of Kiao-chau. On September 3d, Japan landed an army of some 20,000 troops at Lungkow on the northern coast of Shantung. Unusually heavy rains and storms at first impeded the progress of the invading force. On September 25th, however, they took the first advanced position of the Germans to the north of Tsing-tao and drove them to the line of main defence.

In the meantime another invading force was landed at Laoshan Harbour on the south coast of Shantung. These troops, together with a British contingent under the command of Brigadier-General Bernardiston, succeeded in joining hands, early in October, with the northern army, and thus completed the cordon around Tsing-tao. Before this the northern army had seized the Shantung Railroad, cutting off the communication of Tsing-tao with the outside world, while the Japanese fleet in co-operation with the British, had fre-

quently been bombarding its forts. From this time on slow but sure progress was daily made by the besieging forces. Position after position, fort after fort was taken until the successful storming of the Bismarck Fort on November 7th convinced the commander of the fortress, Captain Meyer Waldeck, that further resistance would be useless, and led him to raise white flags. The Japanese troops made their formal entry into the captured city on November 16th.

During the blockade of Tsing-tao Harbour a part of the Japanese fleet was commissioned to capture or destroy the naval bases used by German warships in the South Seas. During this cruise the Japanese squadron occupied the Marshall, Caroline, Mariana, and Palao Islands, and placed special guards therein. After the blockade of Kiao-chau was over, a part of the Japanese fleet was dispatched to hunt out the German Far Eastern squadron, which had been making havoc among the British trading vessels, and had defeated the British squadron off Coronel. Most of these German cruisers have already been sunk, and the rest I am sure will soon be caught.

With the fall of Tsing-tao and the destruction of German warships on the Eastern seas, the first act of the drama in which Japan is taking a

hand is ended. Germany need not feel overchagrined at the capture of Kiao-chau by the Japanese, for the latter have simply proved faithful and apt pupils of their former teachers; the weapons, military tactics, and training that reduced Kiao-chau were those that were taught by the Germans themselves.

Turning now to the relations between Great Britain and Japan, and the spirit and scope of their Treaty of Alliance, we will find the reason why Japan entered into war with Germany. In this study, however, we have to go back again to the past. When Japan was confronted in 1895 by the strong combination of three European Powers, she found herself powerless to resist and withdrew from the Asiatic mainland with whatever grace her self-restraint could command. She discovered, however, that she was not friendless. Great Britain had steadfastly refused to join the European Coalition, and had expressed the strongest disapproval of its action. But England was not yet prepared to actively support the affronted nation. She was still satisfied with her attitude of "splendid isolation." There were not lacking at that time prophets who urged the wisdom of joining hands with the nation which had just demonstrated its military prowess. But theirs

was the voice crying in the wilderness; it fell on deaf ears.

Meanwhile momentous developments were taking place in China. The seizure of Kiao-chau by Germany had inaugurated an era of European aggression in the Manchu Empire. Soon the Russian eagle was flying over the fortress of Port Arthur; France had lodged herself in Kwang-Cho-Wan; England in Wei-hei-Wei. In addition, the scramble for railway, mining, and other concessions from China, with the Kiao-chau Convention as a model, became the order of the day. Far more ominous than these seizures of small spots of land and the extortion of economic concessions, was the phrase "Spheres of Influence," which came into vogue. In the north, Mongolia, Manchuria, and the upper basin of the Hoang-Ho were said to belong to the Russian "Sphere of Influence"; in the centre, the vast and fertile regions of the Yangtze-Kiang were ear-marked as the British "Sphere of Influence"; in the south, the province of Kwang-si, a part of Yunnan and of Kwangtung with the island of Hainan, were claimed by the French as their "Sphere of Influence"; the province of Shantung had the first honour of initiation in the nomenclature of "Spheres of Influence" as the German "Sphere"; even Japan condescended

to mark her "Sphere of Influence" in the province of Fu-kien opposite Formosa. In short, the dismemberment of China among the great Powers seemed to be fairly under way.

These developments were watched by England and Japan with extreme anxiety. They had common grounds for fear. The maintenance of the *status quo* in China and equal opportunities for trade to all nations were of supreme importance to England, in order to preserve the predominating political and commercial influence she had hitherto enjoyed. The independence of China was vital to Japan, for its loss would mean the setting up of European kingdoms at the very door of Japan, to the constant menace of her national welfare, even her existence. For these reasons, England and Japan seemed for a time to have determined to support even single-handed China's integrity and the "open door."

It was once declared in the address of the House of Commons to the Throne "that it was of vital importance for the commerce and influence of Great Britain that the independence of China should be respected." It was announced through the mouth of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, a member of the Cabinet at that time, that "the British Government was absolutely determined, at any

cost, even at the risk of war, that the 'open door' in China should not be closed." But when England saw the audacious proceedings of her rivals in despoiling China, she became a little suspicious of the wisdom of her stand, and seemed to have concluded that the position of Count von Buelow might after all be wiser. The German Chancellor had declared before the Reichstag to this effect:

> Mention has been made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it starts. The devil takes the hindermost.

The demarkation of the British "Sphere of Influence" in the Yangtze regions, and the acquisition of Kowloon opposite Hong-Kong, are the proceedings that reflect the doubting mood of Great Britain. It was the same story with Japan, for while she was constantly proclaiming her determination to maintain China's integrity, she took a hand in the marking of a "Sphere of Influence." The whole story shows the wavering attitude of England and Japan during the years prior to the Boxer outbreak. On the minds of the English and Japanese statesmen was slowly but

steadily dawning the conviction that, unless some effective means could be devised, it would become almost impossible to stem the tide of European aggression in China. England and Japan, separately, experienced the difficulty of holding even its own position, still more of resisting the European combination. England had tried the experiment in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1899 and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900. But England had already been dethroned in the council-board of nations at Peking and relegated to an inferior place. Whatever England proposed to the Chinese Court was almost sure to be frustrated by the counter schemes of Russia, France, and Germany. And England's loss of prestige extended from Peking to Teheran.

As to Japan, her whole diplomatic history, from the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki to that of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, is the history of humiliation and the acceptance of condescension. Through diplomacy she was shorn of the best fruits of her victory over China; from Port Arthur, Wei-hei-Wei, and the Liao-tung Peninsula on which she had shed so ungrudgingly the blood of her sons, she was elbowed out; in Korea, for whose independence and regeneration Japan fought, she found her influence soon waning, and only "saved

her face" by the compromise with Russia in concluding the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1896. Not only was she compelled to acquiesce in these humiliations and injustices, but she was not able to raise one protest against those transactions that snatched from China Port Arthur, Kiao-chau, and other territories, before the very eyes of Japan, that had scarcely winked since the battles of Kinchow and the Yalu.

It was in such a situation that John Hay came out with his famous circular. Its first marked effect was to stiffen the backbone of England and Japan. The credit of the great American statesman lies, therefore, not in the origination of the doctrine of the "open door," but in his giving a strong impetus toward its preservation.

The diplomatic experiences of England and Japan above outlined were sufficient to convince the respective governments that only a strong combination could uphold their policy, and safeguard their interests, in China. Herein are the reasons and genesis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902. The cardinal points of the treaty were the maintenance of China's integrity, and the "open door," and the independence of Korea, and the safeguarding of the special interests in Eastern Asia of the contracting parties. The

Alliance was intended to preserve peace in the Far East, or, if peace was broken, to restrict the area of possible hostilities. It failed to achieve the first object, but it emphatically fulfilled the second. The treaty was renewed in 1905 and again in 1911.

There was some opposition in 1911 to the renewal of the Alliance along certain sections of the British community. It was based on these grounds:

1. The Alliance has already served its purpose. The Russian defeat on the Manchurian fields has dispelled for the time at least the fear of their encroachment on China. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which settled the disputes on the Anglo-Russian border, extending from the Pamir to Teheran, minimized the Russian menace to British rule in India. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, therefore, lost its *raison d'être*.

2. The Japanese Alliance is decidedly unpopular among the British colonies on the Pacific,—Australia, New Zealand, Canada. Their attitude toward Japanese labourers is similar to that of the Americans on the Pacific Coast. Consequently, the antagonism of the colonies to Japanese labourers on the one hand, and the resentment felt by the Japanese people for the humiliation of their

compatriots on the other, might place the British Government in an extremely awkward position if the Japanese Alliance is continued.

3. If we remain allies of Japan, cried Englishmen, there is a possibility of England finding herself in the most embarrassing situation, in case the American-Japanese relation reaches a breaking point. This fear was, however, set at rest by the new Arbitration Treaty clause inserted in the Treaty of 1911.

The opposition failed to shake the profound faith of the responsible statesmen of Great Britain and Japan in the wisdom of renewing the Alliance, and they put their seals to the instrument. Their motives and reasons for doing so must, therefore, be elucidated in order to make plain the aim and spirit of the Treaty now in force, which, in turn, will explain better than anything else the present Far Eastern situation. Such an attempt is now made as briefly as possible.

1. The Imperial policy of Great Britain and Japan demanded the renewal of the Alliance. The late Marquis Komura, who on Japan's side was chiefly responsible in giving birth to the Alliance, presented the authoritative Japanese view of it. He said before the Imperial Diet, "the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the life of Japanese diplo-

macy, and, therefore, everything must be done to avoid any step likely to impair it." The same has been affirmed most forcibly in word and deed by the present Foreign Minister, Baron Kato. It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that gave Japan a free hand to fight Russia. It was the Alliance that prevented the intervention of European Powers after the war, and saved Japan from repeating the bitter experience of 1895. It was the Alliance that added prestige to Japan in the council of nations. It is the Alliance that ensures Japan's safety and safeguards the interests she secured on the Asiatic Continent.

No less great have been the benefits Great Britain has secured from the Alliance. On this point, however, let Englishmen themselves speak for their own country. The following quotation is selected out of many as its forecast is very enlightening on the present European situation. A brilliant English journalist, after reviewing the reign of King Edward, and commenting on the significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, says:

> In foreign affairs proper, there was not a sensitive spot on the map of which it could be truly said that British policy was prosperous or our outlook encouraging. Our relations with Russia involved

increasing friction upon an extending line. To this was now added the definite change, by itself epoch-making, in the traditional relations with Germany. To that state of things, if we persisted in the splendid isolation, there could be only one end—a European coalition under German leadership, and to that might have been added a Russo-Japanese arrangement at our expense in Asia. These were contingencies so real, dangers so definite and urgent, as to bring about what was nothing less than a revolution in our foreign policy. It had to be made and it was made. . . . Splendid isolation was ended by a compact. The Japanese Alliance was the most remarkable and dramatic engagement into which our policy had ever entered. The compact was the solid foundation-stone for the new structure of diplomacy subsequently raised. Having made one Treaty of Alliance we were necessarily open to other negotiations. In face of Germany our sole desire was and is to keep what we had held, but the former co-operation of this Power could no longer be relied upon. That fact, once evident, was bound to become and remain the most important consideration of our policy; the whole perspective in which other questions had been viewed was changed. . . . The evident disappearance of hostility to France, the new open-mindedness with regard to Russia, gradually brought about a corresponding change of thought and feeling in each of these countries. Under King Edward's auspices the *entente cordiale* (with France) was effected; the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* followed; and—this country had eluded greater perils than had threatened her for many a day, and had again

secured a firmer diplomatic position than we had held for a century.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has thus served as the first link in the chain of subsequent understandings among the European allies now engaged in the tremendous struggle against Germany and Austro-Hungary. The far-reaching consideration of England's Imperial policy thus induced her statesmen to conclude the third Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The interests England has to safeguard, it needs no emphasis, are multifold; these impose upon her the shaping of her Imperial policy, not by specific interests in certain spots, but on the terms of continents and oceans. And back of all lies the supreme importance of the command of the sea.

2. Here we come to the second factor that has influenced the continuance of the Japanese Alliance. It has enabled England to withdraw her large Asiatic fleet to the home waters, liberating thus a strong naval force for use in maintaining against the pretension of Germany the supremacy of the sea. England has in a sense confided to her ally the policing of the Eastern waters—a fact not to be overlooked in considering Japan's quick decision to mobilize her fleet against the activities of German warships in Eastern seas.

The foregoing survey of the Far Eastern history and the analysis of the aim and scope of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, will, I hope, make Japan's present action perfectly clear. To summarize, then, the grounds of Japan's war with Germany are:

1. To fulfil her treaty obligations to her ally. Count Okuma, Japan's Premier, declared that

> every sense of loyalty and honour oblige Japan to co-operate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who, in the past, the present, and the future, menace her interests, her trade, her shipping, and her people's lives.

Great Britain, who could hardly dispense with a large fleet or expeditionary force sufficient to reduce Kiao-chau, saw fit to rely upon her ally's arms for the undertaking of the difficult task, and Japan whole-heartedly went to her ally's aid in fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon her by her Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Had Japan desisted from taking such action she would have been forever branded as a cowardly, selfish nation, and none would in future have trusted or befriended her.

2. To establish firmly China's integrity and the principle of the "open door," and to ensure Japan's own safety and a lasting peace in the Orient.

Kiao-chau was the child conceived, begotten, and

bred by the Kaiser's "mailed fist" policy. Kiao-chau was the last vestige of European aggression on China begun in 1895. As long as the German stronghold remained standing to serve the purpose of German Imperialism and militarism, so long the policy which John Hay so lucidly enunciated was in danger of subversion. For who could tell that, when Germany was fully prepared, the nucleus of German Imperialism at Kiao-chau would not develop into a factor whose power the world has not yet measured! Japan has, therefore, resolved in co-operation with her ally to root out German Imperialism in the Far East, in order to place on a safer and more solid foundation the principle for which England, America, and Japan have so long contended, and thus to secure a lasting peace in the Orient. It goes without saying that Japan will never take any measure that might be construed as prejudicial to the interests of the United States. For America is Japan's best friend.

Japan has accomplished her first purpose—that is, has reduced Kiao-chau and destroyed the German warships in the East. But the war is far from being over. Japan, although doing at present nothing but the policing of the Eastern seas, is still at war with Germany. That is certainly one

of the most unique and anomalous spectacles ever presented between warring nations. At this stage it is then absurd to talk, as some are doing, about the disposition of the captured Kiao-chau and of the German islands in the South Seas which Japan has occupied. Who can assure us that Japan will not, before the war is ended, be confronted by a German armada followed by the Kaiser's picked legions, to see whether Japan's victory over a few thousands of the Tsing-tao garrison and a couple of gunboats in Kiao-chau Harbour was final or not? Such a contingency is of course remote indeed, but I cannot share the easy optimism that seems to rule among the Allies and in the American press in general. What accomplished military feats warrant the inspiration of such an optimism? Has not Germany conquered Belgium and is she not in a position even to annex it if she so wills? Has not Germany overrun Northern France? Are not the German legions invading Russian Poland and almost knocking at the gates of its capital? The German armies are fighting on their enemies' soil, and levying heavy fines upon the conquered cities, and not a bit of the Fatherland has yet been wrested from it by its foes. Does this not constitute an enormous advantage for Germany? And the German navy too has already demonstrated

its efficiency and performed some remarkable naval feats which should cause us to pause before we become too optimistic. While I have a firm faith in the ultimate victory of the Allies, at the same time I cannot convince myself that it will be an easy job.

In undertaking the military operations beyond the war zone prescribed by China, some charge Japan with the violation of China's neutrality. Yes, Japan did violate the neutrality of China in exactly the same sense as England and France would violate the neutrality of Belgium by making it the scene of military operations in their effort to drive out the Germans from that much-harassed country. Before Japan landed her troops at Lungkow, the Germans in Kiao-chau had been taking military measures in the Shantung Province far beyond the zone within which China asked Germany and Japan to limit their operations. It would, then, have been suicidal for Japan to confine her military action within the so-called war zone. Others again impute to Japan the violation of the principle of China's territorial integrity, should she retain Kiao-chau after the war. I cannot agree with such a construction. Of course we cannot foretell what final agreement will be made between China and Japan about

Kiao-chau. This much, however, is certain: if the Allies finally win, Japan will have proper claims to make for the blood and treasure expended for the capture of Kiao-chau and in running the great risk of having for her foe a power so formidable as Germany. Even should Japan decide to retain Kiao-chau, it would not be a violation of China's integrity, for Kiao-chau was not a part of China; its complete sovereignty, at least for ninety-nine years, rested in Germany.

Before concluding I might refer to the much-talked-of question of sending Japanese troops to Europe. M. Pichon, M. Clemenceau, and other prominent Frenchmen have been discussing the subject and giving their views to the press, so that the American public and myself are somewhat familiar with their points of view.

But from the Japanese standpoint I must say that it is a question, as Baron Kato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, says, "which should not be lightly discussed, as it has no direct bearing on either Japan's national existence or the peace of the Far East, and it further would seriously affect Japan's finances."

It must be first and most clearly understood that Japanese soldiers will never act as hirelings as the Hessians once did; in other words, will never

sacrifice their lives for money. This is a foregone conclusion. Furthermore we think it is none of our business to interfere with European affairs. We sincerely hope that the Allies will be able to crush by their own hands the German militarism. But at the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the contingency that in case final victory perches on our enemies' arms, the Far East is not immune from German invasion. It follows, therefore, if ever our soldiers go to Europe to fight against our enemies, instead of folding their arms as at present, it will be when England appeals to us for assistance and when the peace of the Far East and our national welfare are at stake.

Photo by Garford, New York

F. V. Greene

EPILOGUE

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES

THE opinions of one man, even though he were far wiser, more experienced, and more learned than myself, in regard to our relations to this epoch-making war—which since it had to come it is a great privilege to study from day to day during its progress, instead of reading about it as past history—are of comparatively small consequence; but the views entertained by a large majority of the 20,000,000 voters in this broad land of ours, if they can be ascertained, are of enormous importance. It is my purpose to set forth in the following pages what I believe to be the views of two-thirds, or even a larger portion of the voting population in this country, so far as I have been able to ascertain them by diligent reading of everything pertinent to the subject that I could lay my hands on during the last eight months.

In the first place, I think it will not be disputed that the people of this country are practically a

unit on the proposition that we should remain neutral; that we should not become involved in the war; and that we should not allow other nations to involve us in it, however much they may try to do so; and in the opinion of many people some of them have tried to do so. The President's proclamation which was issued immediately after the outbreak of hostilities last August was received with universal approval, and so far as I can observe there has been no change in public opinion on that question. Some of our most distinguished and intelligent citizens in Congress, in journalism, and in private life have somewhat vehemently expressed views in regard to neutrality which are not concurred in by any writers on international law either at home or abroad. But while there have been differences as to the manner of observing neutrality, there have been no differences of opinion as to the desirability and necessity of our remaining neutral, not only in letter but in spirit.

But in remaining neutral it has not been possible, even if it were desired, that we should fail to have sympathies and to express them; and I think there is almost unanimous opinion upon the Belgian question. Whatever fine-spun arguments may be put forth by writers of German origin or de-

scent in support of the thesis that Belgium itself had not remained neutral; that not only its sympathies were with France and Great Britain, but it had made plans in advance of the outbreak of war to act in concert with France (and with Great Britain, if she should be the ally of France), it is probably fair to say that these hair-splitting arguments have been brushed aside by the broad common sense of the average man and by the higher intelligence of the specialist in international law. The main fact stands out so boldly that it cannot be successfully contradicted, to wit: that a nation of seven millions of people, as intelligent, as industrious, as self-respecting, as peaceful as any other people of equal numbers on the face of the globe, have been overrun by a powerful neighbour more than ten times stronger than Belgium in resources of every kind; and this neighbour has laid waste one of the fairest portions of the earth, destroying its works of art of great antiquity and priceless value, demanding unheard-of indemnities, and treating its inhabitants with ruthless brutality. In defence of this course, which seems to us in America absolutely unpardonable, Germany has no excuse to offer except that this was the shortest road to France; and that if Belgium would not accept the terms which were offered at the

beginning of the war, viz., that Germany should be allowed to overrun the neutral territory of Belgium on Germany's promise to restore Belgian independence and Belgian property on the conclusion of the war, then Belgium had only itself to blame. This excuse is put forward in spite of the fact that in 1870 when the greatest German of modern times, Bismarck, was asked whether in the war with France Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium, Bismarck promptly and unhesitatingly answered that Belgium's neutrality would be respected. The same treaty which was in force in regard to the neutrality of Belgium in 1870 was still in force in August, 1914; Germany had signed a Convention at The Hague in 1907 to which all the belligerent nations, except Servia, were parties, which plainly says, "Neutral territory is inviolable"; the reasons which induced Bismarck to honor Germany's treaty in 1870 are just as valid and unanswerable now as then. Character, honour, observance of the plighted word—all these are as valuable in a State as in an individual; and in violating their treaties and crushing a gallant and deserving people who had done them no wrong, the German Kaiser and the German people have made an irretrievable mistake. They have thereby alienated the

sympathies of millions of Americans, including many of German descent, who have always admired the many splendid qualities of the German race and fully appreciate what Germany has contributed to art, to literature, to music, to modern civilization. It was a terrible error; the consequences of it have been proportionately great and the worst of them have yet to come. It will be generations before the atonement for this ghastly blunder will be complete.

While Germany by its indefensible course against Belgium has alienated the sympathies of the American people the Belgians and the Belgian King have gained their unbounded admiration. They perhaps made a mistake in their estimate of the readiness of France and England to come to their assistance, but they were under no illusions as to the power of their mighty neighbour on the east. They had no doubt as to what their duty was, or any hesitation in accepting their responsibilities. They determined to defend their independence as a nation at any cost; and overmatched as they were by Germany they had no hesitation in putting their lives and their property to the hazard in attempting to carry out the obligations which the treaties guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium imposed upon them as

a nation. It is hard to find in the history of the world a more splendid page than that which the Belgians and their King have written during the last eight months. Their homes have been destroyed, their non-combatant population is wandering about in search of shelter and food, those who have been reared in comfort and luxury are now suffering penury and want; but their heroic spirit has never flinched for an instant. Their King has been one of themselves, with them in the trenches, close by them on the firing line. His conduct recalls a legendary story of Peter the Great who on the eve of the battle of Pultowa is said to have addressed his troops in language somewhat like the following: "BROTHERS: Know that in the battle of to-morrow your Tsar fights among you, and watches you, but that the life of Peter, like your own, is as nothing compared with the welfare of the country which we serve in common." It is the practice of Russian generals and colonels when they meet their troops for the first time every morning to say, "Good morning, *Brothers*." It is a pleasing custom, whether it had its origin at the battle of Pultowa or dates still further back in Slavic history. Now, in this twentieth century, the ideal relations between a king or commander and the men whom he com-

mands, of which this courteous salutation is the symbol, are actually in existence between the Belgian King and his soldiers. They are in very fact comrades and brothers in arms.

The American people have not been slow to respond to appeals in behalf of the Belgians. The latest official report of the commission for relief in Belgium, only one of several bodies organized for the same purpose, shows that the sum of $21,500,000 had been received by the commission and expended up to February 22, 1915, for the succour of the destitute in Belgium. This great sum has been contributed in a period of business depression and much destitution at home; there are other societies which have received and expended smaller but not inconsiderable amounts; and it is within my personal knowledge that more than one man, himself in destitute circumstances, and not knowing where his next meal was to come from, has sought out some Belgian relief committee and handed in fifty cents or seventy-five cents or eighty cents, probably more than half of all his ready cash, with the remark: "Send it to them Belgians." There are other things besides this great war which are being done on a large scale in this twentieth century; and so far as I know, there has never been in the previous

history of the world a practical expression of sympathy on so vast a scale for the heroic virtues of a foreign people.

The American people also appreciate at its full value the important fact that the Belgian Army has accomplished greater results, in proportion to its numbers, that any of the other armies in the field. Defeated and ultimately driven back by overwhelming numbers because France and England were not as ready as Germany, their forts battered into shapeless ruins by the wonderful German guns, they yet made such a stout defence at Liége, Namur, and Louvain that they delayed the German advance by seventeen days at the opening of the campaign, at a time when every day and every hour were of almost inestimable importance; and in so doing they deranged the assailants' plan of campaign and probably saved Paris from capture. Had France been able to concentrate her troops on the Belgian frontier as quickly as Germany did, and to place 500,000 men alongside the gallant Belgians at Liége and Namur before August 19th; and had England been so prepared that she could place 250,000 men in the vicinity of Brussels and Louvain by the same date, there is ground to believe that the German Army would have been halted within forty miles of the

German frontier. We hear much talk about the futility of fortifications under modern conditions, but this is a hasty and superficial deduction. The forts designed and constructed with such care by Brialmont were destroyed in twenty days, we are told. That is true; but the labour of destroying them delayed the German advance for twenty all-important days. But for these forts there would not have been an hour's delay. The Army of Belgium, stout of heart but insignificant in numbers as compared with the German hosts, with the Army of France more than one hundred miles away and the Army of England not yet on the Continent, would have been swept aside or captured, and von Kluck would have swept on to Paris, as per plan so long before prepared by the General Staff in Berlin. It was Brialmont's forts, notwithstanding their destruction, that enabled the Belgians and their intrepid King to make this splendid defence. So great was the disappointment of the German Staff at the miscarriage of their plans that it was rumoured and long believed that von Kluck had either committed suicide or had been disgraced and dismissed by the Kaiser. It was Belgium, single handed, without any material help from France or England, that caused this delay. We in America admire such a superb

military operation by a comparatively small force against the mightiest army on earth; but we do not yet realize its full importance. When the history of the war is hereafter carefully studied we shall have to make a vigorous search through military annals to find a military service equally heroic and equally important in its results.

Early in the history of the war the question was raised whether we were observing the spirit even if we complied with the letter, of our own neutrality laws, in case we permitted the shipment of arms and ammunition and military supplies to any of the combatant nations. It was set forth by certain members of Congress and by certain very influential newspapers, some of them violent in their German sympathies and some of them ardent advocates of peace on any terms, that if we permitted the export of arms and munitions of war we helped to prolong the contest; and on the other hand, since the fleets of Great Britain and France control the sea, in so doing we aided the Allies and injured the Germans. It seemed for a time as if the Administration was disposed to listen to these views; but they were well advised by experts in the body of rules which govern nations in their relations with each other and which are called International Law, that so far from

violating our neutrality laws by allowing such shipments, we would on the contrary be guilty of a distinct violation of neutrality if we prevented such shipments. It is a well-settled principle of international law that any change by a neutral nation, after the outbreak of hostilities, in its neutrality laws is in itself a breach of neutrality. It is an interesting fact that in the war of 1870 Carl Schurz, then United States Senator from Missouri, protested in the Senate against the sales of arms to France; and his action had important political consequences in this country. It was one of the factors which led to the formation of the Liberal party in 1872, the nomination by that party of Horace Greeley for President, the endorsement of the nomination by the Democratic party, the overwhelming defeat of Greeley in the election of 1872, and the death of Greeley soon after the election. I had the story at considerable length from his standpoint, and a very interesting story it was, from General Grant at St. Petersburg in August, 1878, at the time that he was making his tour around the world. I remember his saying that while he had great respect for Carl Schurz he could not but think that his conduct in this matter showed him to be more of a German than an American, that there was no ques-

tion in his (General Grant's) mind or in that of the members of the Cabinet who advised him as to what his duty was as President, namely, to allow the shipment of arms and munitions to either France or England, provided they were paid for in an American port; we having no responsibility for them after they left our shores. The enmity of Carl Schurz toward President Grant and his Administration dated from this controversy, and because the Administration did not accede to Schurz's view Schurz set out to split the Republican party and to defeat General Grant for the nomination; or if he received the nomination, then to organize from a minority of the Republicans and from the Democrats a party which should defeat him at the election. The plans of Schurz and Sumner and Greeley, as is well known, came to an ignominious failure. The only interest in the matter so far as we are now concerned lies in the fact that the most brilliant and distinguished German who has ever come to this land took the same wrong-headed position, equally untenable in international law and in common sense, that was taken in the early months of this present war, namely, that we should not allow the sale of arms and munitions to any one or all of the combatant nations. It needs but a moment's consideration

to realize that it is not our affair which nation controls the sea; that any one of them is free to come to our ports and there buy and pay for such arms and munitions; and that such combatant nation or its agent assumes the entire risk of safely transporting such goods to their destination. If they are captured on the way, that is their affair, not ours. Equally, if one nation or a group of allied nations control the sea and can procure the safe delivery of such munitions in its or their ports; and if on the other hand, another nation owing to its inferiority in naval strength keeps its battle fleet in its own harbours and cannot safely convoy such munitions to its own ports, then again, that is their affair and not ours. There was some confusion in the public mind on this question for some weeks or a few months after it was raised; but this confusion seems now to have entirely disappeared, except in the minds of a few whose sympathies with Germany are so violent that they refuse to listen to reason. They are, however, so small a minority that it does not appear that they will be able to use their resentment as Carl Schurz did for political purposes.

Many people thought early in the war, and later, that it was the duty of our Government to protest under the terms of The Hague Convention against

the violation of the neutrality treaties and the disregard of the various conventions of 1907 which are intended to prevent the destruction of cathedrals and other architectural monuments and works of art, and the other conventions which were designed to protect the unarmed inhabitants of unfortified places from injury and annoyance. All these things are provided for in the conventions to which all the belligerents except Servia are contracting powers. The sentiment in favour of such protest on our part was at one time quite strong; but on mature reflection public opinion has sustained the attitude of President Wilson that it was unwise to make such protest; partly because our protest would have been ineffectual unless supported by force, and partly because such action on our part might have deprived our Government of the opportunity to render very important service in the bringing about of peace when the auspicious moment to open negotiations for that purpose should arrive.

As the war has progressed other and more difficult questions have arisen, the solution of which is by no means so simple as the question of the right and duty of a neutral nation to allow the sale in its own ports of arms and munitions of war. Great Britain is "Mistress of the Seas." Her

very life depends upon maintaining this position. She seldom has in the British Isles a sufficient store of food to last for more than a few weeks. Her food is brought from Canada, the United States, Australia, and South America; and if she loses control of the sea lanes from these countries to her own islands so that she cannot protect the safe arrival of ships travelling these lanes and bringing food she would quickly be starved to death. Great Britain has therefore for many years and through all Administrations held fast to the policy of maintaining a battle fleet at least twice as strong as that of any possible antagonist. To do otherwise is to invite death. In addition to this a masterful race like the English, Scotch, and Irish—and however much divided in time of peace they act as a unit in time of war, many of her greatest soldiers and sailors having come from Ireland—is disposed to go to the limit in protecting every single detail of her rights upon the sea. It is a curious fact, not generally recognized, that from 1775 to 1865, a period of nearly one century, our relations with Great Britain were almost always strained. During eleven of these ninety years Great Britain and the United States were at war; and during the remaining seventy-nine years the two nations, at constantly recurring

intervals, were on the verge of war, about boundary disputes, about fishery disputes, and other disputes. During all this time, or at least from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the close of the Civil War, we were rivals of Great Britain and sharp competitors with her merchants for the carrying trade on the ocean. During the Civil War the *Alabama* and other cruisers fitted out in Great Britain swept our ships from the sea; we lost our carrying trade on the ocean and for various reasons which it is not necessary here to refer to we have never regained it. Great Britain gladly entered into the Treaty of 1871 under which her liability for the acts of the *Alabama* and other vessels constructed in her ship yards was to be settled by arbitration at Geneva; and when the arbitrators decided that there was a liability and that Great Britain should pay us $15,000,000 in satisfaction for the loss which these vessels had inflicted upon our commerce, the amount was paid promptly and without criticism or protest from any but an insignificant portion of her population. It was a paltry price to pay, in comparison with the indirect loss we had sustained in the complete disappearance of our merchant marine on the one hand, and the contingent advantages which Great Britain gained in the event of future

wars, on the other hand. The principles established by the treaty of Washington and the Geneva arbitration may quite easily be of more value to Great Britain, she being mistress of the seas, than to any other nation in the world. Since we had lost our ocean carrying-trade these principles were of comparatively little importance to us, unless and until we should again have a portion of the ocean carrying trade. And this time has not yet arrived.

Now the point to which I wish to call attention is that so long as we were competitors on the ocean for the carrying trade of the world, the two nations were always in strained relations and frequently on the verge of war. Since we lost our carrying trade on the ocean and Great Britain got the greater share of it, subject only in recent years to ever-increasing rivalry from Germany, Great Britain and the United States have been very warm friends. Canada is a good neighbour, and shedoes a larger trade with us than with the mother country. Great Britain has no objection to this, and her foreign commerce which for several years has exceeded $6,000,000,000 per annum, brings her in an income which leaves a net profit for foreign investments every year of more than $1,000,000,000. We are good friends because we are no longer rivals or competitors. But the

question is, if we again become rivals or competitors in foreign commerce, or in any other matter which affects Great Britain's vital interests, will this friendship continue? It seems unthinkable that the century of unbroken peace between Great Britain and the United States should ever again give place to hostility and war. But less than a year ago it seemed equally unthinkable that such a conflict as is now raging in Europe should in this enlightened age break out. Mr. Choate has been an important delegate at both of The Hague conferences, and he has recently told me that as late as last July he firmly believed that never again would there be a great war in Europe; but he has lived to see the greatest of all wars, notwithstanding all that was exchanged between the various nations, and exchanged in apparently good faith, at the two Hague conferences.

Now, in the progress of the war, the time has come when in desperation Germany has announced her intention to attack all British vessels that she can reach by means of submarines; and has warned all neutral nations to keep away from the dangerous waters surrounding the British Isles for fear that some one of these neutral vessels without intention on the part of Germany might be mistaken

for a British vessel and destroyed. In answer to that Great Britain has decided to isolate Germany from the world, to prevent supplies of any kind, whether contraband or otherwise, from reaching German ports; and has warned neutral nations that their ships destined for German ports will be seized, taken to a British port, the cargo used and paid for, or sold and accounted for, and the vessels set free. This action presents an entirely novel problem in international law. The declaration of Paris in the Treaty of 1856, which followed the Crimean War, denounced the "paper blockades" such as Napoleon and Pitt had declared in the early part of the nineteenth century, and asserted that hereafter "a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective,—that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy's coast line." The principle was reaffirmed, in the words just quoted in the Declaration of the London Conference, made in February, 1909, only six years ago. Such a blockade was maintained by the United States during the Civil War at all the ports of the Confederacy. It was an effective measure, it strangled the Confederacy and was a very potent cause in the settlement of the conflict between the North and the South. But it is not such a blockade as

this that Great Britain has declared; in fact it is not called a blockade at all. It is an order to neutral ships to cease doing business, and if the order is disobeyed the offending ships are to be captured on the high seas wherever found. It seems to have been designed from motives of friendship; because the penalties are simply the interruption of the trade, but do not involve the forfeiture of either vessel or cargo, whereas a vessel, attempting to run a blockade, if the blockade is effectively maintained, is liable to forfeiture, on condemnation in a Prize Court, as is also its cargo. As to the right, however, of a combatant nation thus to order neutral nations to cease carrying cargoes, American opinion is very sharply divided. At the time I write the attitude which will be assumed by the Government of the United States has not yet been determined. It is needless to say that the question presents very grave possibilities.

A question in which the people of the United States are vitally interested is the question of the duration of the war. The outbreak of the war disconcerted our commercial relations with all the world and plunged us into financial disorder which but for the previous passage of the Federal Reserve Banking Law would have produced a money panic

far exceeding in its proportions anything in our previous experience. As the war progressed we have gradually accommodated ourselves to the changed circumstances. While we have been unable to ship our cotton we have received very high prices for our wheat and other food products, and this is likely to continue until the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus releases the stores of food pent up in Russia; then there will be a sudden and tremendous drop in such prices. In other lines of industry we have had great profits. The combatant nations have purchased enormous numbers of automobiles and a constantly increasing amount of munitions of war, all at good prices. Our remittances to Europe for pleasure travel as well as from the labouring population have greatly decreased; so that we have been accumulating a credit balance on an ever-increasing scale month by month until now it is estimated by competent financial authorities that our credit balance for the first year of the war will amount to and possiblye xceed $1,000,000,000. We are thus in a position either to buy back at our own price our securities held in Europe, or to extend credit by taking pay for our goods in short time securities of the belligerent nations. The war may therefore be said to be advantageous to us, from a business

standpoint. But this is a temporary condition, and the foreign trade out of which we are now making a great deal of money will come to an abrupt termination the moment hostilities are terminated and negotiations for peace are taken up. Moreover, the trade relations of all the world, our own included, have been completely changed by the war, and in the future they will be very different from what they have been in the past. It will take a long time to adjust ourselves to these new conditions, and the sooner we get at it the better. Obviously we cannot get at it until the war ends.

Nearly every day everyone asks someone else how long the war will last; and no one is in position to give a satisfactory answer. Lord Kitchener has said that he thought the war would last three years. He said this a good many months ago. He may now have a different opinion. At the beginning of our Civil War most people said that the war would last only a few months; and when General Sherman ventured the opinion that it would be a stubborn contest lasting several years many people thought him crazy and his reputation as a soldier and as a man of common sense was for a time seriously and adversely affected. It does not seem that there is at the

present time any sufficient data upon which anyone can with any certainty venture a prediction as to the duration of the war. Only one thing seems certain, and that is that when the weather becomes settled in April or at latest in May, the ground becomes dried and the season for vigorous military operations arises, we shall see such carnage in Northern France as has not been witnessed in historic times. Just how it will result no man can predict. On the defensive is the most marvellous military machine ever constructed and organized; on the offensive there will probably be greatly superior numbers, wearing the uniforms of nations which are determined to see this thing through to a finish, and to inflict, if possible, upon the nation which in their judgment has brought on this terrible catastrophe such punishment that not for more than one generation will that nation again attempt to disturb the peace of the world. How it will result one man can judge as well as another. Most people in America think that the Allies are sure to win; that superior numbers, backed by superior financial resources, must prevail as they did in our Civil War. But, looked at from a technical standpoint, soldiers who have given most careful consideration to the question, are disposed to think that it is still almost an equal con-

test; that superior efficiency on the one hand will counterbalance superior numbers on the other. It is possible that Germany may be driven back to the Rhine; but that she can be driven back from the Rhine to Berlin is a hazardous prediction. Other than military conditions may bring about a suspension of hostilities and negotiations for peace. Germany's ally has proved a weak reed to lean upon; the Austrian armies have gained no success and have suffered many defeats since the beginning of the war; and now the surrender of Przemysl seems an irreparable disaster. Conditions may change any moment as to Italy, but in this latter end of March it seems as if she was about to throw in her lot with the Allies. Certainly, there is no longer an expectation that Italy will come to the aid of Germany. Germany's ally on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles has also been a disappointment; and at the present writing it seems as if the Turk would be expelled from Europe and the century-long dream of the Slavs that the Cross should again be placed over the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Constantinople from which it was displaced by the Minaret and the Crescent nearly five centuries ago, is about to be realized. Whatever the fate of Constantinople may be there is no longer any reason to anticipate that Turkey

can render any great assistance to Germany. Germany therefore opens the spring campaign in conflict with the whole of Europe, and with practically no ally. People in Berlin may well be thinking whether it would not now be best to restore the *status quo ante* 1870, stop the waste and ravage of war which has already exceeded all anticipations and fairly staggers the imagination, and begin while there is yet time to recuperate before her own land is invaded or even threatened. There has been no fighting on her soil except in a small portion of East Prussia. Sober-minded people in various parts of Germany may perhaps begin to think that they can gain their "place in the sun" by peaceful methods as they had been doing during the ten years before the war broke out. On the other hand, Germany may decide, as the South did in 1863, to fight it out to the bitter end, although ultimate success was impossible. If Germany should make such a decision, the war will last a long while, for she still has enormous resources.

Finally, what is to be the effect of this war of unprecedented magnitude upon these United States and the hundred million people who live in them. As to this I have seen little expression of opinion in the public press; but it seems possible

and even probable that the effect upon us, neutral as we have been and probably will be to the end, will be no less important and far-reaching than upon those nations whose sons by the hundreds of thousands have given up their lives fighting for what they believe to be the right.

We are wasteful and extravagant in our national, state, city, and county finances; we introduce 30,000 bills every year in Congress without any expectation that one in a hundred will receive serious consideration; we laugh at the lessons of history and say that those things which have happened to other nations will not happen to us; in an industrial and economical sense our efficiency is far below that of Germany and France; we pass so many laws in forty-eight different States and make so many decisions in their various courts that no man can keep track of them or know what the law is; we harass the business of the country on which its prosperity is based by legislation designed to catch votes and keep the legislator on his job; we pay out gigantic sums in pensions not for any good military reason, or to reward the deserving veteran who is placed on the same level as the man who served thirty days and never saw a fight, but for the purpose of corrupting the electorate; we have allowed individual States—Louisiana,

South Carolina, and California—to pass legislation in disregard of the spirit of our treaties made in pursuance of the Constitution and we acknowledge ourselves powerless to prevent it; the first instance of this happened nearly seventy years ago, and the one now pending is that of California in its legislation which is intended to be a studied insult to the Japanese race.

We have grown rich beyond all precedent but we have failed to realize that this was due to our having millions of acres of virgin soil of the highest fertility which we could afford to give away to any actual settler. This land is now practically all gone and our industrial and economic methods will have to be completely changed if we are to compete with Germany and France in manufactures, with Russia in farm products, with China in minerals, and with Japan in commerce.

From 1783 to 1898 our orators said on every recurring Fourth of July that our government was the wisest ever devised by man, and that our experiment in republican self-government was the hope of mankind slowly emerging from the tyranny of the past. We thought that no one would ever dare attack us and that we would never think of attacking any other nation. Yet in 1898 we were the aggressors, although our cause

was just, in a most insolent form. We were equally aggressive in the Venezuela matter in 1894; and the same members who in Congress vote against any appropriations for battle-ships are the first to introduce and advocate defiant and bellicose resolutions whenever a cloud appears upon the diplomatic horizon.

In this war we have seen such efficiency on the part of the Germans as puts us to the blush; and we are beginning to learn what some people have long known, that it is not only in war but in peace that the German is efficient. The German thinks our form of government is greatly inferior to his own, and he knows that our administration of municipal affairs, as compared with his own, is a joke—or a crime. In this war we have seen France display a courage and a calm determination which, in view of what we have said for so many years about the mercurial temperament of the French, about their immorality and their dissipation, must make us, or those of us who think at all seriously, ashamed of ourselves.

We have seen England make a supreme effort to defend her national life and her national honour equal to that which we made in the Civil War. We have seen Russia suddenly adopt a drastic prohibition law which seems in a few months to have

destroyed the drunkenness which was the curse of the Russian moujik and which, according to competent authorities and students like Leroy-Beaulieu, formerly reduced their efficiency by at least thirty per cent.

During the last eight months we have seen the world in convulsion; and whatever the result may be as to the map of Europe and the maps of other continents, as to armament and disarmament, as to indemnities and pledges for the future, these seven hundred million people who are now at war will enter upon the forthcoming peace chastened, subdued, sobered, filled with an intense desire to repair the waste of the war, and willing to work for this purpose on what will seem to us to be almost starvation wages. We shall have to enter the competition. Our economical and industrial situation in this twentieth century makes it impossible for us to keep out of it. Unless our methods change we shall soon drop behind. It is a time for us to search out our hearts, to ask ourselves whether we are capable of such sacrifices as the nations of Europe are making in behalf of what each considers the right. We showed that we could do this fifty years and more ago in the Civil War, but it is by no means certain that we have the strength of character, the moral fibre,

the intense devotion to an ideal which our ancestors of that period possessed. In the coming competition after peace is declared, every competitor will have to stand on his own feet without prop or support such as we have had in the past from our public lands and the principle of protection which derived its value from them. It is not only the nations at war whose future is at stake. Ours is equally at stake. It would be well for us to think seriously how we shall fare in this coming competition, and to begin to make plans for changing our habits and discarding our wasteful methods and our "buncombe" politics so that we may enter upon it with some chance of success.

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